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INTRODUCTION
In the past year, scholarly and political consensus has become near
uniform that the armed conflict Congress recognized in enacting the
statutory Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) after the
terrorist attacks of September 2001 has materially changed. 1 By its text
† Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. The author wishes to
thank Christopher Chyba, Eugene Fidell, Martin Flaherty, Steve Vladeck, and Sabin Willett for
helpful comments.
1 See, e.g., ROBERT CHESNEY ET AL., A STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR NEXT-GENERATION
TERRORIST THREATS (Hoover Inst. ed., 2013), available at http://www.hoover.org/research/
statutory-framework-next-generation-terrorist-threats; Robert M. Chesney, Essay, Postwar, 5
HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 305, 315–22 (2014) (discussing Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001)); Jennifer Daskal & Stephen I.
Vladeck, After the AUMF, 5 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 115 (2014); Harold Hongjuh Koh, Sterling
Professor of Int’l Law, Yale Law Sch., Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Regarding Authorization for Use of Military Force After Iraq and Afghanistan (May 21, 2014),
available at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Koh_Testimony.pdf; Michael B.
Mukasey, Written Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Regarding
Authorization for Use of Military Force After Iraq and Afghanistan (May 21, 2014), available at
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Mukasey_Testimony.pdf;
President
Barack
Obama, Remarks at the National Defense University (May 23, 2013) [hereinafter Obama NDU
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and the interpretation subsequently given it by successive
administrations, Congress, 2 and the courts, 3 the AUMF authorizes the
President to detain and lethally target individuals who are “part of or
supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners.” 4 Today, the Taliban no longer controls the Afghan
government, and the U.S. military is set to withdraw the bulk of its
combat forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. 5 The United States
has long since handed over control of its major in-theater detention
facility to the Afghans. 6 The core of the terrorist organization al-Qaeda
that attacked the United States in 2001 has been substantially
destroyed. 7 And while dozens of new radical Islamic terrorist groups
have emerged in the past decade—many of which share an ideological
affiliation or even part of a name with the original al-Qaeda, some of
which pose a threat to the United States—none of these actors were the
focus of the original AUMF, aimed at those who perpetrated the attacks,
or harbored the attackers, of September 11, 2001. 8
Speech], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-presidentnational-defense-university.
2 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat 1298
(2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
3 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (“There can
be no doubt that individuals who fought against the United States in Afghanistan as part of the
Taliban, an organization known to have supported the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for
those attacks, are individuals Congress sought to target in passing the AUMF.”); Al-Bihani v.
Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g denied en banc, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
4 Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872 & n.1 (quoting Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy
Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the Navy (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul
2004/d20040707review.pdf); see also id. (“The AUMF authorizes the President to ‘use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.’” (quoting AUMF § 2(a))).
5 See President Barack Obama, Statement on Afghanistan (May 27, 2014), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/27/statement-president-afghanistan (noting
that the United States will conclude combat operations in Afghanistan by the end of 2014).
6 See, e.g., Richard Leiby, U.S. Transfers Control of Bagram Prison to Afghan Officials, WASH.
POST (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-transfers-prison-control-toafghan-officials/2012/09/10/7edf7496-fb17-11e1-875c-4c21cd68f653_story.html. The United
States still retains control over a small number of non-Afghan prisoners held at the Bagram
facility. See id. (“The United States also will retain custody of nearly 50 foreign nationals at
Parwan—many of them Pakistanis accused of fighting for the Taliban.”); see also Spencer
Ackerman, Revealed: The Hunger Strikes of America’s Most Secret Foreign Prisoners, GUARDIAN
(July 16, 2014, 9:19 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/16/bagram-detaineeshunger-strikes-revealed (reporting that the United States continues to hold thirty-eight nonAfghans at the facility).
7 See Obama NDU Speech, supra note 1.
8 See, e.g., JAMES R. CLAPPER, OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATEMENT FOR
THE RECORD: WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 4–5
(2014), available at http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/testimonies/203-congressional-
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Yet of all the complex problems associated with moving the United
States away from the al-Qaeda–related “perpetual wartime footing,” as
the President has urged, 9 perhaps none has proven more vexing than
that of resolving detention operations at the U.S. Naval Base at
Guantanamo Bay. The vast majority of the 149 detainees still held there
arrived at the prison from Afghanistan well over a decade ago, 10 and no
new detainees have been brought to the prison for six years. 11 Indeed,
Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama—as well as former
presidential candidate John McCain and a host of senior military leaders
and policy officials of both political parties—have called for the prison’s
closure. 12 Despite this, achieving the prosecution, transfer, or release of
the remaining detainees has proven to be an extraordinary challenge.
The reasons why it has proven so difficult to close Guantanamo are
varied: the diplomatic need to find host countries for those who cannot
be repatriated without facing the risk of torture or persecution, a step
that would today violate settled law; 13 the legal difficulty of prosecuting
cases for which sufficient evidence was never gathered, or for which

testimonies-2014/1005-statement-for-the-record-worldwide-threat-assessment-of-the-usintelligence-community.
9 See Obama NDU Speech, supra note 1.
10 Charlie Savage, Decaying Guantánamo Defies Closing Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2014, at
A1.
11 See FINAL REPORT: GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE 1–2 (2010) [hereinafter
GUANTANAMO TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT], available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/pdf/GTMOtaskforcereport_052810.pdf.
12 See, e.g., Senator John McCain, Speech on Foreign Policy at the World Affairs Council
(Mar. 26, 2008), available at http://www.cfr.org/elections/mccains-speech-foreign-policy-march2008/p15834; President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security (May 21,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-nationalsecurity-5-21-09; Julian E. Barnes, Retired Military Brass Press Obama on Guantanamo Closure,
WALL ST. J. (June 4, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/06/04/retired-military-brasspress-obama-on-guantanamo-closure; Melissa McNamara, Bush Says He Wants to Close
Guantanamo, CBS NEWS (May 8, 2006), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/bush-says-he-wants-toclose-guantanamo; Thérèse Postel, How Guantanamo Bay’s Existence Helps Al-Qaeda Recruit
More Terrorists, ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/
2013/04/how-guantanamo-bays-existence-helps-al-qaeda-recruit-more-terrorists/274956 (citing
statements by Generals Petraeus and Powell favoring the closure of Guantanamo).
13 See GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 26–27; see also
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1242(a), 112 Stat.
2681, 2822 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2012)) (“It shall be the policy of
the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person
to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of
being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United
States.”); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 3, Apr. 18, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (“No State Party
shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”).
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evidence has been made unusable by prisoner torture or abuse; 14
perennial problems with novel military commission trials, which have
prolonged some war crime prosecutions for years; 15 and the
administration’s own concerns that some fraction of prisoners cannot
be lawfully prosecuted but are nonetheless too dangerous to release. 16
Yet if some of the foregoing challenges are historically familiar
problems of prisoner repatriation at the end of war, 17 one significant
contemporary obstacle to Guantanamo closure is without identifiable
precedent. Beginning in 2009, Congress has attached spending
restrictions to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), barring
the transfer of Guantanamo detainees into the United States for any
purpose, 18 and barring the transfer of any Guantanamo detainee to any
other country unless the Secretary of Defense determines that actions
have or will be taken to “substantially mitigate the risk of such
individual engaging or reengaging in any terrorist or other hostile
activity that threatens the United States or United States persons or
interests,” and that the transfer affirmatively “is in the national security
interest of the United States.” 19 While the 2014 NDAA somewhat
loosened the restrictions placed on transfers of detainees outside the
United States, 20 the prohibition on the use of funds for transferring any
of the detainees to the United States under any circumstances remains. 21
14 See, e.g., GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 5 (“[T]he
Task Force’s initial responsibility was to collect all government information, to the extent
reasonably practicable, relevant to determining the proper disposition of each detainee. The
government did not have a preexisting, consolidated repository of such information.”); id. at 22–
23; see also Joint Appendix at 103–05, Al Odah v. United States, 551 U.S. 1161 (2007) (No. 061196) (quoting declaration of Lt. Col. Stephen A. Abraham as describing one Guantanamo
hearing system as relying on incomplete evidence, scattered across agencies, and consisting only
of statements of a “generalized nature—often outdated, often ‘generic,’ rarely specifically relating
to the individual subjects of the [combatant status review tribunal hearings] or to the
circumstances related to those individuals’ status”).
15 See, e.g., Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that it is
unconstitutional for military commissions to try the offense of “providing material support for
terrorism” for conduct occurring before 2006).
16 GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 12.
17 See infra Parts I–VI.
18 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 1034, 127
Stat. 672, 851 (2013) [hereinafter 2014 NDAA] (“No amounts authorized to be appropriated or
otherwise made available to the Department of Defense may be used during the period beginning
on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 2014, to transfer, release, or
assist in the transfer or release to or within the United States, its territories, or possessions of
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed or any other detainee . . . .”); see also Ike Skelton National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 1032, 124 Stat. 4137, 4351;
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 14103(d), 123 Stat. 1859, 1920–21.
19 2014 NDAA, supra note 18, § 1035(b).
20 Id. § 1035(a) (additionally authorizing transfer if pursuant to court order, or if the Secretary
determines “that the individual is no longer a threat to the national security of the United States”).
21 Id. § 1034.
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As a result, options the President might otherwise have for handling the
cases of certain detainees—including criminal prosecution in a U.S.
federal district court, or the release of detainees or transfer for
continued detention to another prison facility inside the continental
United States —are not available.
As this Article demonstrates, in none of the major wars of the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries in which U.S. detention operations
are now concluded—World Wars I and II; Korea and Vietnam; and the
1991 and 2003 Iraq Wars—has Congress imposed any such restriction
on the exchange, transfer, or release of prisoners, during or after the
period of armed conflict. 22 Rather, for the hundreds of thousands of
prisoners held during the course of these wars, the disposition of
prisoners held pursuant to wartime authorities has always come to an
end, and has always been handled by the executive branch. Among the
most common mechanisms for the resolution of detention are executive
agreements that provide for prisoner exchange, transfer, or release,
negotiated with a wartime enemy, often through a neutral third-party
intermediary. 23 For all the controversy surrounding the Executive’s
prisoner exchange agreement that resulted in the transfer of five
Guantanamo detainees to Qatar and the release from Taliban custody of
U.S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, 24 such arrangements are, from a
historical perspective, prevailing U.S. custom.
Does this historical practice matter? Should it? In separation-ofpowers debates, arguments based on historical practice have been
central to Presidents’ claims that they enjoy broad authority under
Article II of the Constitution to enter, for example, into executive
agreements with foreign powers without gaining the advice and consent
of the Senate needed to conclude a treaty. 25 Indeed, the Supreme Court
has famously held that a long-standing executive practice, coupled with
congressional “acquiescence” to the practice, may be enough in some
22 See infra Parts I–VI. This Article uses the term “prisoners” rather than, for example,
“prisoners of war,” to indicate that it encompasses a broader set of detainees held by the United
States during these armed conflicts, rather than only those formally entitled to prisoner of war
status as that term is defined by the modern Geneva Conventions. See Geneva Convention (III)
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3406, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force with respect to the United States on February 2, 1956). While
many of the detainees described here were indeed entitled to prisoner-of-war status, and were
treated as such, the United States also held many other prisoners during these conflicts—
detainees ultimately determined to be civilians or otherwise not entitled to POW status per se.
See, e.g., infra Part IV.
23 See infra Parts I–VI.
24 See, e.g., Sarah Almukhtar et al., Key Questions in the Release of Bowe Bergdahl, N.Y. TIMES
(June 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/05/world/asia/key-questions-in-therelease-of-bowe-bergdahl.html.
25 See, e.g., Brief for the Federal Respondents at 40–41, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654 (1981) (No. 80-2078), 1981 WL 390302.
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cases to lend a “gloss” to the meaning of the executive power under
Article II—a reflection of the common understanding of both political
branches as to the substantive scope of constitutional authority. 26 To the
extent the Obama Administration and others have questioned the
constitutionality of the NDAA restrictions on executive power to
conclude agreements resulting in the release of Guantanamo
detainees, 27 there is little doubt that claims from practice would figure
centrally in any elaborated argument. 28
Yet as the Supreme Court and scholars have long recognized,
reliance on congressional acquiescence to past practice as an indicator
of constitutional meaning is problematic at best. Congressional silence
on any particular executive action may be a reflection of congressional
approval; it might also be a reflection of congressional ignorance,
uncertainty, or indifference. 29 Further, it is rarely entirely clear to what
extent either Congress or the President has acted based on an
understanding of its own constitutional power. In the foreign relations
context, it may be especially unclear whether a particular executive
action is taken pursuant to an executive understanding of statutory
delegation, or based on the Executive’s view of its own Article II
authority. Moreover, elevating practice to the level of constitutional
significance also poses a serious, formal problem of interpretation; it
seems unlikely that the same legal effect should attach both to
26 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203
(1942).
27 See President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on H.R. 3304 (Dec. 26, 2013),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/26/statement-president-hr-3304
(“Section 1035 of this Act gives the Administration additional flexibility to transfer detainees
abroad by easing rigid restrictions that have hindered negotiations with foreign countries and
interfered with executive branch determinations about how and where to transfer detainees.
Section 1035 does not, however, eliminate all of the unwarranted limitations on foreign transfers
and, in certain circumstances, would violate constitutional separation of powers principles. The
executive branch must have the flexibility, among other things, to act swiftly in conducting
negotiations with foreign countries regarding the circumstances of detainee transfers.”); see also
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 38–40, Ajam v. Butler, No. 14-5116 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2014),
available
at
http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Ajam-Brief.pdf
(“By
conditioning the substance of any agreement with a transferee nation . . . and addressing the
nature and conduct of the transferee nation . . . Congress intrudes upon the President’s
management of delicate foreign relations.” (internal citations omitted)).
28 Important additional questions surround the constitutionality of the Executive’s action in
the Bergdahl case. In particular, the President apparently failed to comply with the current NDAA
restrictions on detainee transfers, requiring the President give Congress thirty days’ notice before
the transfer or release of any detainee release from Guantanamo Bay. See 2014 NDAA, supra note
18, at § 1035(d) (“The Secretary of Defense shall notify the appropriate committees of Congress of
a determination of the Secretary under subsection (a) or (b) not later than 30 days before the
transfer or release of the individual under such subsection.”).
29 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 414–16 (2012) (summarizing arguments against reliance on
congressional acquiescence to past executive practice).
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congressional silence, and to affirmative legislation that has satisfied the
express hurdles of bicameral passage and presentment to the executive. 30
In any case, one need not embrace historical practice as evidence of
constitutional meaning to conclude that such a practice has salience in
current statutory and policy debates. Arguments surrounding the
present extraordinary congressional involvement in the disposition of
the Guantanamo prisoners seem to rely in some measure on a sense that
current circumstances are uniquely challenging because prisoners’ home
countries are politically unstable or in the midst of continuing conflict
themselves; prisoners still harbor violent intentions toward the United
States; the United States continues to face short- and long-term threats
from groups that share ideological commitments with the men at
Guantanamo; prisoner exchanges empower the enemy; and so forth. 31
Such factors are challenges indeed. But, as this Article seeks to
demonstrate, they are deeply and historically familiar features of the end
of war.
This Article offers a brief account of when and how the United
States has handled the release of prisoners held in its custody during and
after periods of armed conflict in the past century. It is not meant to
endorse the wisdom or legality of all such efforts. On the contrary, some
of the practices described, such as the transfer of German prisoners of
war (POWs) to Allied nations following World War II for use as labor
in national reconstruction projects, were and are unquestionably
problematic as a matter of law. 32 Rather, it is meant principally to
describe how the United States has concluded its prisoner operations in
past armed conflicts—conflicts involving thousands and often tens of
thousands of prisoners, including (during World War II) hundreds of
thousands held inside the continental United States. 33 A handful of these
30 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 91
(1988) (“For every case where the Court rhapsodizes about deliberative inaction, there is a
counter-case subjecting such inferences to scathing critique. ‘To explain the cause of non-action
by Congress when Congress itself sheds no light is to venture into speculative unrealities[’] . . . .”
(quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119–20 (1940))).
31 See, e.g., GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 12; David E.
Sanger & Matthew Rosenberg, Critics of P.O.W. Swap Question the Absence of a Wider Agreement,
N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2014, at A7 (quoting Representative Mike Rogers (R-MI), chairman of the
House Intelligence Committee, as arguing that exchange of Taliban prisoners for American POW
has “empowered” the Taliban by giving them U.S. government recognition).
32 See infra Part II. The relevant international law regulating the repatriation of prisoners in
the current armed conflict is treated separately elsewhere. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Law at the
End of War, 99 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
33 See infra Part II. Although the focus of this Article is on armed conflicts of the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries, the history of U.S. prisoner detention during wartime manifestly
begins in the revolutionary era. See, e.g., GEORGE G. LEWIS & JOHN MEWHA, HISTORY OF
PRISONER OF WAR UTILIZATION BY THE UNITED STATES ARMY 1776–1945, at 1–16 (facsimile ed.
1988); PAUL J. SPRINGER, AMERICA’S CAPTIVES: TREATMENT OF POWS FROM THE
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prisoners were eventually tried for crimes, including war crimes under
international law. But the vast majority of them were simply released,
either while hostilities were still ongoing or shortly after hostilities came
to an end, and were repatriated to their home countries, transferred to
other nations, granted asylum in the United States, or exchanged for
American prisoners held by still deeply distrusted enemies. These
arrangements were made by the executive branch—often by the military
directly, sometimes through more formal executive agreement—and
were generally informed by overarching treaty obligations previously
undertaken by the United States. While the disposition of wartime
prisoners has regularly been the subject of intense public attention at the
end of war, particularly to the extent the fate of our own prisoners was
at stake, Congress’ current engagement on disposition of a handful of
particular prisoners held at one facility in this armed conflict is without
precedent in the past century.
I. WORLD WAR I
From the time the United States entered World War I on the side
of its European allies in April 1917, until the signing of the Treaty of
Versailles in June 1919, the United States held tens of thousands of
prisoners in both Europe and the United States. Between June 1918 and
March 1919 alone, the Army’s Department of the Provost Marshal
General (PMG) reports handling 48,280 enemy prisoners. 34 Pursuant to
regulations adopted in the months before the United States declared
war, the War Department (today, the Department of Defense) was given

REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR (2010). For a particularly insightful history of the
treatment and disposition of Civil War–era prisoners, see JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE:
THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2012).
34 LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, at 59 (describing the PMG as an office that has existed in
wartime since the Revolutionary War); JOHN J. PERSHING, FINAL REPORT, H.R. DOC. NO. 66-626,
at 85 (1920) [hereinafter PERSHING REPORT], available at https://archive.org/details/finalreportof
gen00unit (“All prisoners taken by the American troops were kept at least 30 kilometers behind
our lines under guard by the Provost Marshal General’s Department . . . .”). In addition, the U.S.
Justice Department interned approximately 4000 civilian “alien enemies” inside the United States
pursuant to Congress’ declaration of war and a series of presidential proclamations imposing
restrictions on enemy alien activities. See President Woodrow Wilson, Proclamation No. 1443,
Extending Regulations Prescribing the Conduct Toward Alien Enemies to Include Women (April
19, 1918); President Woodrow Wilson, Proclamation No. 1408, Setting Forth Additional
Regulations Prescribing Conduct toward Alien Enemies (Nov. 16, 1917); President Woodrow
Wilson, Proclamation No. 1364, Declaring the Existence of a State of War with the German
Empire and Setting Forth Regulations Prescribing Conduct toward Alien Enemies (April 6, 1917).
These civilian prisoners were interned in the same War Department camps as the war prisoners,
and held in separate quarters. RICHARD B. SPEED III, PRISONERS, DIPLOMATS, AND THE GREAT
WAR: A STUDY IN THE DIPLOMACY OF CAPTIVITY (1990).
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responsibility for holding all captured war prisoners in U.S. custody. 35
While the U.S. Secretaries of War and State initially debated where
captured prisoners should be held—the War Department was interested
in preserving prisoner labor for use by allied forces in Europe, while the
State Department was concerned that holding its prisoners outside the
United States might violate existing treaty obligations—it was the Army
that ultimately prevailed. Most prisoners captured by the United States
in France would be held in theater, and only officers would (for a time)
be sent to the United States for detention. 36 Total figures vary
somewhat, but in the end, approximately 1400 war prisoners were held
in United States—a population that included officers seized in Europe as
well as crews from German ships found near U.S. ports, many at the
opening of hostilities. 37
At the broadest level, a series of international agreements shaped
the disposition of prisoners at the end of the war. For example, most of
the belligerent states (including the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, and Germany) had ratified the Hague Convention of 1907; it
provided, consistent with then-recent international practice, that
“[a]fter the conclusion of peace, the repatriation of prisoners of war
shall be carried out as quickly as possible.” 38 According to the final
report prepared for Congress by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied
Expeditionary Forces, General John Pershing, the PMG was, thus,
“instructed to follow the principles of The Hague and the Geneva
conventions in the treatment of prisoners,” although the United States
hedged on whether these treaties were legally binding upon it “in the
present war.” 39
More specific to the instant conflict, the belligerent parties entered
into an Armistice agreement to bring about a ceasefire on the western
front on November 11, 1918; the terms of the agreement were
negotiated by President Wilson on behalf of the United States. As the
President publicly explained to a joint session of Congress on the day of
35 LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, at 50–51. The December 14, 1916 “Regulations Governing
the Transfer of Prisoners of War from the Custody of the Navy to that of the Army” provided that
the War Department would hold all war prisoners in its custody. Id. at 50. These regulations were
later formally promulgated as Special Regulations No. 62, “Custody of Prisoners of War” 1917,
shortly before the United States declared war. Id. at 51.
36 LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, at 52–53; see also SPEED, supra note 34, at 126–27.
37 LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, at 57 (indicating 1346 prisoners held in the United States).
The War Department’s Annual Report of 1918 cites 1411 POWs as being held in the United States
at Ft. McPherson, Georgia as of June 30, 1918. WAR DEP’T, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY
OF WAR: 1918, at 189–90 (1918).
38 Convention Between the United States and Other Powers Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land art. 20, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter 1907
Hague Convention]; Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
39 PERSHING REPORT, supra note 34, at 85.
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the signing, the Armistice required Germany immediately to repatriate
all allied prisoners; Germany, in contrast, would enjoy no such
immediate reciprocity. 40 The disposition of remaining war prisoners
would be a topic of negotiation in connection with a broader peace
treaty; the allied governments agreed that these negotiations would
remain secret until the final settlement was announced. 41 In the end, the
Treaty of Versailles indeed included detailed provisions setting forth the
terms for prisoner exchanges and repatriation, including the
requirement that “repatriation of prisoners of war and interned civilians
shall take place as soon as possible after the coming into force of the
present Treaty and shall be carried out with the greatest rapidity.” 42
Ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles were finally exchanged by the
European governments on January 10, 1920, prisoners were released,
and Allied Expeditionary Forces headquarters in France was shut down
by August 31, 1920. 43
Perhaps ironically, in the face of this vigorous international
diplomacy, neither the Armistice nor the Treaty of Versailles turned out
to guide U.S. prisoner repatriation significantly in practice. The
Armistice imposed essentially no obligations on the United States to
repatriate prisoners. And, caught up in irresolvable debate over
President Wilson’s League of Nations proposal, the U.S. Senate never
succeeded in ratifying the Versailles Treaty. 44 Despite this, the United
States remained highly motivated to end its prisoner operations in the
United States and abroad, driven by the intense cost of maintaining its
prison infrastructure and its desire to demobilize from war in general.
40 WOODROW WILSON, TERMS OF ARMISTICE SIGNED BY GERMANY: ADDRESS OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS, H.R. DOC. NO. 65-1139,
at 5–6 (1918).
41 Military Terms for Germany, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 1918), http://query.nytimes.com/mem/
archive-free/pdf?res=9807EED61539E13ABC4A53DFB7678383609EDE.
42 Treaty of Versailles art. 214, June 28, 1919, 2 U.S.T. 43, 2 Bevans 43; see also, e.g., id. art. 216
(“From the time of their delivery into the hands of the German authorities the prisoners of war
and interned civilians are to be returned without delay to their homes by the said authorities.
Those amongst them who before the war were habitually resident in territory occupied by the
troops of the Allied and Associated Powers are likewise to be sent to their homes, subject to the
consent and control of the military authorities of the Allied and Associated armies of
occupation.”); id. art. 220 (“Prisoners of war or other German nationals who do not desire to be
repatriated may be excluded from repatriation; but the Allied and Associated Governments
reserve to themselves the right either to repatriate them or to take them to a neutral country or to
allow them to reside in their own territories.”); id. art. 221 (“The Allied and Associated
Governments reserve the right to make the repatriation of German prisoners of war or German
nationals in their hands conditional upon the immediate notification and release by the German
Government of any prisoners of war who are nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers and
may still be in Germany.”).
43 LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, at 63.
44 Senate Defeats Treaty, Vote 49 to 35; Orders it Returned to the President, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
19, 1919), http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0319.html.
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Indeed, the United States began repatriating war prisoners before any
other allied nation. 45 Repatriation was handled entirely through the
executive branch and largely in accordance with the provisions of the
broad instructions of The Hague and Geneva Conventions. 46 Enemy
medical officers and other “sanitary personnel” were repatriated first,
followed on April 9, 1919, by prisoners who were determined to be
“permanently unfit for further military duty” or could otherwise not
perform useful labor. 47 Full repatriation of German prisoners held in
Europe began September 7, 1919 and—perhaps in light of the relatively
small number of prisoners by then under American control—took just
seventeen days to complete. 48 By the close of 1919, the U.S. Army held
just over 1300 prisoners in the United States. 49 In the following year, the
number would drop to forty-four (including both POWs and interned
“enemy aliens”)—all of these in hospitals receiving treatment, nearly all
to be soon deported or released. 50
Critically, throughout this period, Congress evinced essentially no
interest in engaging questions regarding the release or repatriation of
the vast bulk of enemy prisoners. This was hardly for lack of interest in
the handling of the war or the enemy in general, or for lack of concern
about the security threat posed by German nationals in the United
States and abroad. Galvanized by aggressive propaganda campaigns and
the 1916 explosion of a munitions facility in New York Harbor, rumors
abounded domestically throughout the period of the threat posed by a
broad network of German spies and saboteurs preparing to attack
America from within. 51 Congress thus adopted statutes such as the 1917
Trading with the Enemy Act, providing for, among other things, the
temporary seizure of enemy property in the United States until disputes
surrounding its ownership could be resolved. 52 Congress likewise passed
various laws during the war providing for the appropriation of stipends
SPEED, supra note 34, at 178–79.
PERSHING REPORT, supra note 34, at 85; SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 140.
47 PERSHING REPORT, supra note 34, at 85.
48 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 140.
49 WAR DEP’T, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR: 1920, at 289 (1920).
50 WAR DEP’T, REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY TO THE SECRETARY OF
WAR 94 (1921).
51 SPEED, supra note 34, at 156.
52 Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, ch. 106, § 7(c), 40 Stat. 411 (current version at 50
U.S.C. § 7(c) (2012)) (providing that “[i]f the President shall so require, any money or other
property . . . held . . . for the benefit of, an enemy” be conveyed to an Alien Property Custodian,
who would hold all rights in the property unless and until any disputes involving the legitimate
ownership of the property required its return). President Wilson later issued a presidential
proclamation clarifying that any prisoner of war counted as an “enemy” within the meaning of
the law. Proclamation No. 1427, Proclamation Including Germans and Austro-Hungarians in the
Custody of the War Department Within the Term “Enemy” for the Purposes of the Trading with
the Enemy Act (Feb. 5, 1918).
45
46
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for American POWs held by the enemy, as well as provisions for the
hospitalization of prisoners determined to be insane. 53
As the war moved toward a close, Congress had additional cause
for concern about the security impact of the release of its prisoners:
conditions in post-war Germany were the opposite of stable. The
German economy had collapsed, along with its political order; Allied
blockades had left swaths of the population near starvation. 54 Thousands
of Russian prisoners held by Germany during the war set out to flee the
country, mostly on foot, and thousands of them died en route—some of
cold or hunger, many of ongoing violence. 55
Yet while Congress proved itself more than willing and able to
block the executive’s wishes in some matters—the Senate’s refusal to
ratify the Treaty of Versailles was seen as a particularly devastating blow
to President Wilson 56—Congress passed no laws regarding U.S.-held
POWs, and no laws so much as mentioning the Armistice. 57 Indeed,
even as Congress debated various aspects of the Treaty of Versailles
extensively, and the Treaty itself contained detailed provisions regarding
the disposition of war prisoners, there was essentially no discussion in
Congress of prisoner issues surrounding the debates on the Treaty. 58
II. WORLD WAR II
Congress evinced a similar disinclination to engage in such
questions at the end of World War II. Here, the relative lack of
53 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 16, 1918, ch. 55, 40 Stat. 530 (providing $80,000 for Americans taken
POWs); Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 79, 40 Stat. 373 (authorizing Secretary of War to transfer internees
and POWs to civilian hospital for mental health care).
54 SPEED, supra note 34, at 171.
55 Id. Many of those who survived returned to Russia to join the Bolshevik forces, staunchly
opposed by the Allies, ultimately contributing to the ascendancy of the Communists, who would
become America’s primary ideological enemy for the second half of the century. Id. at 172–73.
56 See JOHN MILTON COOPER, JR., WOODROW WILSON: A BIOGRAPHY 7 (2011) (“Tragically,
his greatest triumph sowed the seeds of his greatest defeat. . . . [The Treaty of Versailles] might
have had the chance to work if the victors had stuck by it in years to come, but they soon showed
they would not. The first of the victors to renege was the United States, which never ratified the
Treaty of Versailles and never joined the organization that Wilson helped establish to maintain
the peace . . . .”); see also Senate Defeats Treaty, Vote 49 to 35; Orders it Returned to the President,
supra note 44.
57 This conclusion is based on a search of U.S. Statutes at Large database, for any laws enacted
between 1918 and 1919 that included the terms “prisoners of war” or “armistice” in the text of the
statute. See United States Statutes at Large, U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=STATUTE (last visited Oct. 18, 2014).
58 This conclusion is based on a search of HeinOnline’s U.S. Congressional documents
collection, for any documents (from 1918–1920) including the terms “armistice” and “prisoner.”
See U.S. Congressional Documents, HEINONLINE. This conclusion is also based on a search of
ProQuest’s Congressional publications collection, for any publications (from 1918–1919)
including the terms “prisoner” and “Versailles.” See Congressional Publications, PROQUEST.
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congressional engagement on questions of prisoner release was perhaps
even more surprising. The United States held more than seven million
prisoners during the course of World War II—more POWs than in
every other American conflict combined. 59 Almost 400,000 of these
prisoners were brought to the United States for detention during the
war, 60 to be housed in prisoner camps erected across the American
heartland. 61
The vast population of prisoners held in the United States
generated a host of domestic political debates, and Congress was far
from disengaged. Between 1940 and 1947, Congress passed several
statutes relating to the handling of POWs, from criminal laws to deal
with prisoners who might escape, 62 to labor laws regulating how prison
labor could best be utilized. 63 Indeed, perhaps no issue related to the
housing of prisoners in the United States garnered more attention than
whether and how war prisoners should be used to aid the economy at
home. The 1929 Geneva Convention permitted the use of prisoner labor
under various conditions, 64 and agriculture, industry, and various
agencies of the U.S. federal government quickly came to rely on prisoner
labor heavily. 65 Labor leaders in turn regularly engaged members of
Congress in efforts to limit the use of such labor, out of growing
concern that the employment of prisoners was taking jobs away from
American citizens. 66
Congress also had additional reason to engage on prisoner issues:
the prospect of prisoner release in this conflict did not wait until the end
of the war. Arranged primarily with the aid of neutral Swiss
intervention, Germany and the United States carried out prisoner
exchanges throughout the war. More than 1000 German POWs were

SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 143.
Id. at 146.
61 ARNOLD KRAMMER, NAZI PRISONERS OF WAR IN AMERICA 26–31 (Stein & Day 1979)
(listing major German prisoner of war internment camps in states from Massachusetts and
Maine, to Wisconsin, Missouri and Oklahoma, to Texas, California, and Wyoming).
62 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 30, 1945, ch. 103, 59 Stat. 101 (“An Act [r]elating to escapes of
prisoners of war and interned enemy aliens”); see also S. COMM. ON JUDICIARY REP. NO. 180
(1945) (statement of Sen. McCarran, describing problem of civilians helping prisoners of war to
escape, and lack of prosecution options in these cases short of treason).
63 See Act of July 16, 1943, ch. 242, 57 Stat. 566 (provides for use of POWs on conservation
and water projects until six months after cessation of hostilities in the present war as determined
by proclamation of the President or concurrent resolution of Congress).
64 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 27, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat.
2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343 [hereinafter 1929 Geneva Convention] (“Belligerents may employ as
workmen prisoners of war who are physically fit, other than officers and persons of equivalent
statue, according to their rink and their ability.”).
65 See id. arts. 27–34. See generally LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, ch. 11.
66 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 160–61.
59
60
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returned in five separate exchanges. 67 In Europe, U.S. military command
in the field further repatriated large numbers of prisoners throughout
the conflict; indeed, near the end of the war, many German prisoners
were captured, disarmed, and immediately released without being
formally processed into prison camps. 68
Despite the inescapable political salience of prisoner issues, it was
the War Department that again took responsibility for—indeed, insisted
upon—the relatively rapid post-war repatriation of all U.S.-held
prisoners. 69 As in previous conflicts, prevailing treaties provided some
broad guidance on the repatriation of prisoners post-conflict. Similar to
the Hague Convention before it, the 1929 Geneva Convention on
Prisoners of War provided that the “repatriation of prisoners shall be
effected with the least possible delay after the conclusion of peace.”70
Also, as in previous conflicts, executive branch agreements with our
wartime enemies set further terms for prisoner repatriation. 71 Initial
armistice agreements with Italy and Japan required the defeated powers
to effect the immediate handover of all Allied prisoners, with no
reciprocal commitment by the Allies to return prisoners held. 72 An
agreement between the Allied powers and Germany—drafted by the
Allied powers—also required the release of all Allied prisoners without
making any reciprocal commitment for the unconditional release of
Allied-held German prisoners. 73 A subsequent peace treaty with Italy
KRAMMER, supra note 61, at 229.
SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 146 (citing EARL F. ZIEMKE, THE U.S. ARMY IN THE
OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 1944–1946, at 291 (1975)).
69 KRAMMER supra note 61, at 229, 233–35.
70 1929 Geneva Convention, supra note 64, at art. 75.
71 See Craig Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude International
Agreements, 64 YALE L.J. 345, 352–56 (1955) (“A familiar exercise of the Commander in Chief
power has been the conclusion of armistice agreements with defeated enemies. Perhaps the first
use of this power was the agreement terminating the Spanish-American War.”).
72 See Italian Military Armistice, U.S.-It., Sept. 3, 1943, 61 Stat. 2740 (agreement between
General Eisenhower, Commander in Chief (CINC) of the Allied Forces, and Marshal Pietro
Badoglio, Head of Italian Government, requiring immediate handover of all prisoners to CINC
Allied Forces without commitment regarding return of prisoners by Allied side); see also
Surrender by Japan: Terms between the United States of America and the other Allied Powers and
Japan, Sept. 2, 1945, 59 Stat. 1733 (“We hereby command the Japanese Imperial Government and
the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters at once to liberate all allied prisoners of war and
civilian internees now under Japanese control and to provide for their protection, care,
maintenance and immediate transportation to places as directed.”); Armistice Agreement
between the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Hungary, Jan. 20, 1945, 59 Stat. 1321;
Agreement between the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the
United Kingdom, and Bulgaria, Respecting an Armistice, Oct. 28, 1944, 58 Stat. 1498; Agreement
between the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United
Kingdom and Rumania Respecting an Armistice, Sept. 12, 1944, 59 Stat. 1712.
73 See Declaration Regarding Germany by the United States of America and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Social Republics, and the
67
68
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committed the Allies to repatriate Italian prisoners “as soon as possible
in accordance with arrangements agreed upon by the individual Powers
detaining them and Italy.” 74 An executive agreement reached on July 26,
1945 between President Truman, U.K. Prime Minister Winston
Churchill, and Chairman of the Nationalist Government of China
Chiang Kai-shek, likewise promised the repatriation of Japanese
prisoners following Japan’s surrender in the war. 75 As for Germany, the
initial agreement among the parties remained the prevailing instrument
in force regarding prisoners; it provided that repatriation of German
POWs should be delayed until the end of the war with Japan, until the
conclusion of a formal peace treaty with Germany, or for such time as
prisoner labor remained needed for rebuilding and restoration, or for
other security considerations. 76
Even as these agreements were being negotiated, in May 1945, the
Department announced its policy of returning all POWs in the United
States to Europe “as rapidly as possible ‘consistent with’ the need for
their labor on essential military and contract work, and the military
situation abroad.” 77 The “consistent with” exception was a concession to
those in U.S. agriculture and industry who feared losing so much free
labor precipitously. For a brief time, those needs actually succeeded in
delaying the repatriation of some prisoners; the President announced a
sixty-day deferment in the return of contract prisoners to address a
temporary labor shortage in various agricultural sectors. 78 While some
members of Congress pushed for further extensions, President Truman
stuck with the War Department schedule, 79 and Congress took no
further action on the issue. 80
Provisional Government of the French Republic, June 5, 1945, 60 Stat. 1649, T.I.A.S. No. 1520
[hereinafter Declaration Regarding Germany] (providing (in Article 15) for cessation of
hostilities, assumption of provisional authority over Germany by victorious Allies, and requiring
(in Article 6) release of all Allied prisoners to Allies under terms set by Allies without reciprocal
promise); see also Surrender by Germany: Terms between the United States of America and the
other Allied Powers and Germany, May 7–8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1857.
74 Treaty of Peace with Italy, U.S.-It., art. 71, ratified June 14, 1947, 61 Stat. 1245 (entered into
force Sept. 15, 1947) (“Italian prisoners of war shall be repatriated as soon as possible in
accordance with arrangements agreed upon by the individual Powers detaining them and Italy.”).
75 The Potsdam Declaration outlined the terms of surrender for the Empire of Japan, and
provided that POWs would be returned to their homes after surrender to effect. LEWIS & MEWHA,
supra, note 33, at 258.
76 Declaration Regarding Germany, supra note 73.
77 KRAMMER, supra note 61, at 231 & n.12 (quoting ARMY SERVICE FORCES, CIRCULAR NO.
191 (1945)); see also LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, at 172.
78 LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, at 173.
79 Id. (describing Truman’s urging that POW labor be replaced with returning U.S. war
veterans).
80 Allied prisoners were not always sent directly home. The United States entered into
agreements with several of its European allies providing that U.S.-held prisoners would be sent
first to, for example, France, for use in post-war reconstruction projects. Despite sharp objections
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Repatriation efforts of prisoners held inside the United States thus
proceeded at a relatively brisk pace. The War Department designated
so-called Italian Service Units, volunteer units of Italian POWs in the
United States, for the earliest repatriation as reward for their wartime
service; all Italian POWs were returned home by March 1946. 81
Beginning as early as 1944, some members of Congress began pushing
the President to accelerate efforts to secure prisoner exchanges with
Japan, out of concern for the treatment of American soldiers held by the
Japanese. 82 But the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee, tasked with
evaluating legislative options, ultimately recommended against
congressional action on the grounds that the State Department was
already taking all possible steps to secure the release of American
prisoners. And indeed, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration,
half of all U.S.-held Japanese prisoners were home by end of 1945, all by
the end of 1946. 83
The release of German prisoners was handled on somewhat
different terms, but ultimately with similar results. The War
Department unsurprisingly prioritized the repatriation of especially
young, old, and sick prisoners; perhaps more surprising, the
Department also prioritized the repatriation of prisoners deemed
“hardened Nazis” as “useless” for labor purposes and therefore readily
returnable. 84 With some exceptions —for prisoners to be held for war
crimes prosecution and for prisoners deemed to be providing essential
labor—German detainees were given the option of repatriation or
rehiring as voluntary civilian workers. 85 By July 1946, with the exception
of 141 Germans serving prison sentences, and near that number still
held in hospitals or psychiatric wards, all German prisoners had left the
United States. 86
In Europe, repatriation was generally carried out by regional
commands, 87 with the Mediterranean Theater of Operations Prisoner of
War Command tasked with repatriating on the order of 100,000
German POWs, 88 and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary
by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), approximately 700,000 prisoners were
transferred by the United States to France pursuant to such an agreement. Id. at 240–41.
81 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 148; see also LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, at 190.
82 See SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 78th Cong., EXCHANGE OF
AMERICAN CITIZENS INTERNED OR HELD PRISONERS OF WAR BY THE JAPANESE 1 (Comm. Print
1951).
83 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 149.
84 KRAMMER supra note 61, at 237.
85 Id. at 249.
86 Id. at 255.
87 LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, at 259–60 (noting that repatriation efforts were suspended
for several months in early 1946 due to labor shortages, to resume again in August 1946).
88 LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, at 192.
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Force in Europe (SHAEF) (commanded by General Dwight D.
Eisenhower) responsible for repatriating hundreds of thousands more. 89
As in the United States, by summer 1945, SHAEF was releasing all
young, old, and female prisoners, along with those prisoners deemed of
insufficient labor value. Repatriation was slowed to an extent by the
active interest of various allied European powers in securing the use of
prisoner labor for post-war rebuilding efforts, and for a time U.S. forces
undertook negotiations to hand over some of its prisoners to allied
governments in exchange for assurances that the prisoners once
transferred would be treated in accordance with Geneva standards. But
these programs were ultimately short lived, rejected in the face of the
ICRC’s sharp criticism over post-war use of prisoner labor, U.S.
concerns with managing the planned return to Europe of 260,000
additional prisoners who had been held in the United States, and desires
to speed U.S. troop withdrawal from Europe generally. SHAEF was thus
keen to schedule the complete closeout of its prison operations by end
of June 1947, a goal it effectively achieved. 90 In the end, the United
States was the first Allied nation to free its war prisoners in Europe. 91
Yet again, for all of Congress’s active involvement in other warrelated (including prisoner-related) issues, and despite the vast social
and economic impact that holding that many prisoners had on the
domestic United States, 92 Congress enacted no laws throughout this
period respecting whether or how any of the prisoners were to be
released. 93 As in World War I, it was hardly as if the U.S. public or its
representatives were oblivious to the matter of transfer or release. On
the contrary, public debates over the disposition of prisoners were
active, dominated in the first instance by concerns about finding
replacement labor for the prisoners who were now to be returned
home. 94 Others raised serious security concerns that Nazis sent home
would again pose a security threat, 95 or that the return of so many
89 Exact numbers of prisoners captured and repatriated from European-based detention
facilities remain difficult to ascertain, in part because some detainees were captured and released
without formal processing. See SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 146.
90 LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, at 242–43 (noting that the last American-held POW was
released on June 30, 1947).
91 KRAMMER, supra note 61, at 249.
92 See, e.g., id. at xiii–xv.
93 This conclusion is based on a search of U.S. Statutes at Large for any laws (from 1940–
1947) including “prisoners of war” in the text, as well as a search of ProQuest Congressional (all
sources, same time period) for documents including the term “prisoners of war”; see also id. at
232–34.
94 Labor interests demanded prisoners’ immediate repatriation to avoid concerns they would
continue to occupy jobs better given to returning American soldiers. Entities that had effectively
employed POW labor, particularly the Department of Agriculture as well as various agencies of
the United States government, resisted repatriation. Id. at 231–33.
95 Id. at 235–36.
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prisoners to Germany at once would risk destabilizing still fragile postwar Allied rule in sectors across the country. 96 But no one appeared to
question the basic scheme—that the executive, and in particular the
military, would make the security and policy calculations necessary to
determine the terms by which wartime detention came to an end.
III. KOREA
From the beginning of U.S. combat operations in Korea in July
1950, prisoner operations figured centrally in the U.S. mission leading
U.N. military forces in opposing the Chinese and Soviet-backed North
Korean invasion of the South. 97 The South Korean government had
vigorously argued that any prisoners taken in the conflict should be
ideologically segregated—many North Korean fighters were in fact
South Koreans who had been conscripted by the North’s army, and the
South maintained they should be classified not as POWs, but released as
civilian internees. 98 When U.S. command initially resisted this
approach, South Korea removed itself from critical aspects of prisoner
operations; South Korea continued to supply guards for prison
operations, but refused to provide food, logistical, or any other form of
support. 99 By 1950, the primary responsibility for maintaining the
prisoners was thus with the United Nations Command (UNC), led by
the United States. 100 And while thousands of Chinese and North
Koreans taken prisoner by U.N. forces during the war indeed
surrendered without fight, 101 the South Koreans had been right to
anticipate that UNC prisoner camps would be plagued by violence, with
prisoners organizing into communist and anti-communist factions. 102
Worse, dealing with these clashes, and with other aspects of prisoner
operations, was no small-scale problem. Within the first year of United
States engagement, U.S. personnel had handled more than 150,000
prisoners. 103

Id. at 233.
The United States led U.N. Command military forces, and generally dominated policy
regarding the treatment of prisoners captured during the conflict. SPRINGER, supra note 33, at
167.
98 Id. at 168–69.
99 Id. at 167.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 167–68.
102 Id. at 168–73.
103 Id. at 168; see also 99 CONG. REC. 4271, 4275–76 (1953) (letter from Thruston B. Morton,
Assistant Sec’y of State, to Sen. William F. Knowland, submitted into record) (reporting that the
UNC notified the ICRC of approximately 175,000 prisoners taken over the course of the conflict).
96
97
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The subject of repatriation was likewise fraught from the outset.
The Communist parties took the position that all prisoners must be
repatriated “without delay” at the end of hostilities, pursuant to the
terms of the then-newly adopted 1949 Geneva Convention (III) Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. 104 Indeed, while the United States
in 1950 had signed, but not yet ratified, the 1949 Convention, General
Douglas McArthur had made it clear that not only U.S. military
personnel, but also all UNC forces would adhere to the treaty’s
provisions. 105 Yet despite its commitment to abide by the treaty’s terms,
the United States, as well as the other U.N. forces, sharply resisted the
Communists’ unconditional claim to prompt repatriation at the end of
hostilities. The notion that U.N. forces would simply return all captured
prisoners outright was unattractive for a host of reasons. For one thing,
the United States suspected Communist forces of having committed
numerous atrocities against captured prisoners, in manifest violation of
other provisions of the Geneva Conventions. 106 Further, in security
terms, a wholesale prisoner exchange surely worked to the Communists’
military advantage. 107 U.N. forces held more than fifteen times the
number of prisoners Communist forces held (making repatriation a
major security interest of the Communists). 108
More, and indeed swamping all of these issues in importance at the
time, was the reality that substantial numbers of prisoners taken by the
United States and its U.N. allies had no desire to be returned, having
been conscripted into service in the first place or having surrendered to
the Americans or their allies on the battlefield. 109 Following the muchcriticized Allied decision after World War II to forcibly repatriate
thousands of Russians and Eastern Europeans who had fought against
communism, President Truman in particular was not prepared to force
the repatriation of prisoners against their will. 110 It was for this reason

104 See Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3406, T.I.A.S. No. 3364. The Communists also invoked Article 7 of the
Convention, prohibiting POWs from renouncing any of the rights the Convention guaranteed.
SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 173–74.
105 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 168.
106 WILLIAM STUECK, THE KOREAN WAR: AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY 244 (Princeton Univ.
Press 1st prtg. 1995).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 212 (explaining that an “all-for-all” exchange, sought by the Communists, would
“give the Communists a much greater opportunity to strengthen their forces,” compared to the
one-for-one exchange the Americans favored); see also SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 174 (noting
the UNC recommended a one-for-one exchange of prisoners).
109 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 167; see also id. at 174–77 (describing thousands of prisoners’
refusal of repatriation).
110 Id. at 163; STUECK, supra note 106, at 245, 264; see also, e.g., Hanson W. Baldwin, Next
Steps in Far East Pose Big Dilemma for U.S.: Military Pressure Might Speed a Truce But West is
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that prisoner exchanges and release became a central topic of peace
discussions from the commencement of talks not long after the U.S.
entry into the war in July 1951, until the conclusion of the Armistice
agreement temporarily halting fighting in July 1953. 111 Indeed, the
disposition of prisoners was the single unresolved issue between the
negotiating sides for the last fifteen months of the war. 112
Given the centrality of prisoner issues to the President’s decision to
continue to fight a bloody and stalemated war, 113 the subject could
hardly have gone unnoticed on the domestic political scene. Peace
negotiations were followed regularly on the pages of the New York
Times, with prisoner repatriation issues in the foreground. 114 With the
fate of prisoners forcibly repatriated after World War II still somewhat
fresh in memory, domestic political support seemed initially behind
Truman’s disinclination to force repatriation. 115 Yet it need hardly have
been thus. It is difficult to imagine today any such public consensus
around a President’s insistence on prolonging an unpopular war for
more than a year, including the ongoing imprisonment of Americans
held captive by the other side, in the interest of upholding a principle
against the forced repatriation of Chinese and North Korean nationals.
Indeed, the Democrats suffered a sweeping political defeat in 1952, in
part over the Truman administration’s handling of the prolonged war. 116
When Republican President Eisenhower took office in January
1953, he likewise faced a fraught political climate, this time from within
his own party. Republicans held the barest of majorities in the U.S.
Reluctant to Use It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1952, at E3 (describing concerns that anti-communist
prisoners face torture or death upon repatriation).
111 STUECK, supra note 106, at 225 (citing “arrangements relating to prisoners of war” as one of
the five items identified by the parties to negotiate the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from
Korea); see also SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 173.
112 Barton J. Bernstein, The Struggle Over the Korean Armistice: Prisoners of Repatriation?, in
CHILD OF CONFLICT: THE KOREAN-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP, 1943–1953, at 261–62 (Bruce
Cumings ed., 1983); see also id. at 306 (noting that during this period, American forces suffered
an additional 32,000 casualties).
113 Bernstein, supra note 112, at 263; see also id. at 276, 278–80 (discussing reasons why the
President and many in the military opposed forced repatriation, including its effects in
undermining the willingness of enemy armies to surrender to U.S. forces; the moral injustice of
the practice; the Cold War political consequences of being seen to pursue a morally suspect
policy; and the prospect of enjoying a propaganda victory over the Communists).
114 See, e.g., Lindesay Parrott, Reds Earlier for Study, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1951, at 1; Lindesay
Parrott, Reds Must Also Agree Not to Limit Cease-Fire Inspectors to the ‘Ports of-Entry,’ N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 1951, at 1; Lindesay Parrot, U.N. Planes in Area of Prisoner Camp, Ridgeway
Concedes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1952, at 1.
115 STUECK, supra note 106, at 264; see also, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 112, at 280 (noting
significant, if not overwhelming, congressional support for opposing forced repatriation);
Baldwin, supra note 110 (describing concerns that anti-communist prisoners face torture or death
upon repatriation).
116 DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 913 (Simon & Schuster 1992).
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House and Senate, and a sizable faction on the Republican right
opposed armistice negotiations at all. 117 Communist governments at the
time continued to back the North Korean cause, and indeed political
tensions on the Korean peninsula, erupting sporadically in shows of
military force, remain high to this day. 118 Further, armistice negotiations
had been carried out since 1951 with active congressional debate over
the Bricker Amendment in the background—a series of attempts led by
Republican Senator John W. Bricker, with strong Republican support in
the Senate, to amend the Constitution to restrict executive power to
conclude treaties and executive agreements—the very process President
Eisenhower soon vigorously engaged in to bring about a cessation of
hostilities on the Korean peninsula. For different reasons, Truman or
Eisenhower might well have come to a different position on the
significance of repatriating communist war prisoners.
Yet despite the public and highly politically salient debate
surrounding the disposition of war prisoners, the continued (and
projected indefinite) state of tension between the ideologically opposed
parties, and opportunities for Congress to learn more and engage
further through regular consultations with the White House over
armistice negotiations, 119 Congress in the end took no action restricting
executive arrangements on the exchange or repatriation of enemy
prisoners. 120 On a few occasions, Congress requested and was provided
information about reported prisoner insurgencies in various Korean
prison camps. 121 Toward the end of armistice negotiations, some
members expressed concern about the role of India as a proposed
neutral party that could receive prisoners who expressed a desire not to
return. 122 But Congress passed no laws, and otherwise took no
significant legislative action, related to the subject of prisoners held by
the United States or UNC forces throughout the period.

STUECK, supra note 106, at 317–19.
See generally Beina Xu & Jayshree Bajoria, The China-North Korea Relationship, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN REL.—BACKGROUNDERS (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/china/china-northkorea-relationship/p11097.
119 STUECK, supra note 106, at 323.
120 This finding is based on a search of U.S. Statutes at Large between 1950 and 1954 for any
textual reference to “Korea and prisoner,” and searches of ProQuest Congressional (including the
Congressional Record, CRS reports, and other legislative documents) during the same period for
textual mentions of “Korea and prisoners” and “Korea and Armistice.”
121 See, e.g., H.R. Res. 661, 82d Cong. (1952) (“Requesting the Secretary of the Army to furnish
to the House of Representatives full and complete information with respect to insurgency in
prisoner-of-war camps in Korea and Communist-inspired disturbances of the peace in Japan”);
H.R. REP. NO. 2128 (1952).
122 See 99 CONG. REC. 4271, 4275–76 (1953) (statement of Sen. William F. Knowland, and
letters between Sen. Knowland and Thruston B. Morton, Assistant Secretary of State, submitted
into record).
117
118
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In the end, prisoner exchanges and repatriation were, again,
handled by executive agreement. As in previous conflicts, the United
States had affected multiple exchanges and repatriations before the end
of the war. 123 Consistent with that practice, the U.S. military in the field,
and the Department of State and the White House in Washington, took
the lead in crafting U.S. negotiating positions on repatriation at the end
of the war, and it was through this hard-fought interagency process that
the U.S. government settled on pursuing the principles supporting the
prisoner repatriation plan that was ultimately adopted. 124
In spring 1953, the multinational delegates to the armistice talks
agreed on the exchange of all sick and wounded prisoners in so-called
“Operation Little Switch,” resulting in the swap of 6670 Communist
prisoners for 684 United Nations-affiliated personnel. 125 It was not until
that summer that parties reached agreement on the bulk of the
remaining detainees—an agreement memorialized in Terms of
Reference for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) (a
document later annexed to the full armistice agreement that brought
about a cease-fire in the war). 126 Under the Terms of Reference
supporting what became “Operation Big Switch,” each side agreed to
turn over any prisoner who refused repatriation to the NNRC, a
specially created international organization to be run by delegates from
India. 127 The NNRC could hold these prisoners for up to ninety days to
allow representatives of the prisoners’ home countries to explain to the
prisoners their rights of repatriation. If after this period, a prisoner still
declined to accept repatriation, he would be released from prison and
would assume civilian status. 128 Ultimately, approximately 23,000
Chinese and North Korean prisoners refused repatriation, while more
than 82,000 agreed to return home. 129 The UNC would exchange 76,000
North Korean and Chinese prisoners for 12,700 allied prisoners then

123 For example, between July and October 1952, the United States released approximately
38,000 prisoners, who, according to the Secretary of State Dean Acheson, were deliberately
misclassified as civilian internees so they could be released notwithstanding ongoing negotiations
over the fate of POWs who did not wish to be repatriated to the Communist North. Bernstein,
supra note 112, at 307 n.121.
124 STUECK, supra note 106, at 259–61.
125 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 175–76 (describing “Operation Little Switch” as at the
instigation of U.S. General Mark W. Clark).
126 Agreement on Prisoners of War, U.S.-China-Kor., June 8, 1953, 28 DEP’T ST. BULL. 866,
reprinted in 47 AM. J. INT’L L. SUP. 180; see also SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 176.
127 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 176.
128 Id.
129 WALTER G. HERMES, TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT app. B-1, B-2 (Stetson Conn ed.,
1966).
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held by the North. 130 The final prisoners—repatriates or not—were
released from detention by January 1954. 131
IV. VIETNAM
Vietnam differed from earlier twentieth century conflicts in a
variety of respects, the U.S. approach to prisoner detention among
them. Although U.S. military engagement in Vietnam began at low
levels during the Eisenhower administration, and both U.S. military and
intelligence activities in the country increased over the ensuing decade,
the first U.S. combat troops did not arrive in Vietnam until 1965. 132 The
same year also marked a key shift in the handling of prisoner operations
in the conflict, a shift important for understanding the nature of
eventual release and repatriation decisions. Before 1965, the South
Vietnamese government handled all detention operations, treating
captured insurgents, fighters, and Communist loyalists of all kinds as
criminals, and integrating them into the existing domestic prison
system. 133 Although the South Vietnamese had no formal classification
system, prisoners fell broadly into three categories: (1) uniformed Viet
Cong or North Vietnamese Army personnel engaging in military
actions; (2) sympathizers, collaborators, and various clandestine
supporters of the North, who were neither uniformed nor engaged in
direct military action; and (3) prisoners of various affiliations wishing to
defect to the South Vietnamese. 134
This initial South Vietnamese detention program was fraught with
problems. Civilian jails quickly became overwhelmed, lacking the space
and personnel to manage the intense prisoner traffic. 135 Despite
worsening violence throughout the period, limited prison capacity
meant that there was little choice but to release fighters regularly; as new
prisoners came in, others were quickly discharged. 136 Further, the ICRC,
SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 177.
HERMES, supra note 129, at 496.
132 See H.R. MCMASTER, DERELICTION OF DUTY: JOHNSON, MCNAMARA, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF, AND THE LIES THAT LED TO VIETNAM (1998).
133 See ROBERT C. DOYLE, THE ENEMY IN OUR HANDS: AMERICA’S TREATMENT OF PRISONERS
OF WAR FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERROR 302–03 (2010); SPRINGER, supra note
33, at 182.
134 CHERYL BENARD, ET AL., RAND NAT’L DEF. RESEARCH INST., THE BATTLE BEHIND THE
WIRE: U.S. PRISONER AND DETAINEE OPERATIONS FROM WORLD WAR II TO IRAQ 34 (RAND
Corp. 2011) [hereinafter RAND REPORT], available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/
pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG934.pdf.
135 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 181–82; see also RAND REPORT, supra note 134, at 37.
136 RAND REPORT, supra note 134, at 37. In 1965, 24,878 political prisoners passed through
the detention facilities, and 15,987 were released. Average time of confinement for prisoners,
130
131
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the United States, and other Western nations raised serious concerns
about prison conditions and severe prisoner mistreatment. 137 Abuses of
prisoners committed by the South Vietnamese were seen at least as
partly the responsibility of the United States, the main supporter of the
South’s effort to contain the insurgency. 138 By 1965, increasing U.S.
military engagement in the conflict, and growing concerns that brutal
South Vietnamese treatment of Communist prisoners might worsen the
treatment of U.S. soldiers captured by the North, led the United States
to engage more aggressively in detention operations in South Vietnam.
In 1965, the United States established the Military Assistance
Command Vietnam (MACV) under the direction of General William
Westmoreland to support South Vietnamese detention operations. 139
While the United States continued to turn captured detainees over to
the South Vietnamese and considered South Vietnam the detaining
power throughout the conflict, 140 the United States was responsible for
constructing five new prison camps in theater and assisting in their
administration; the United States insisted that all prisoners be afforded
POWs status at least until their formal status could be determined; and
it provided training and guidance to troops on compliance with Geneva
restrictions on prisoner treatment. 141 Further, throughout the conflict,
the United States urged the parties to pursue a reciprocal program of
prisoner repatriation—usually in the face of strong resistance by both
North and South Vietnamese in a position to facilitate prisoner
exchanges. 142 The South Vietnamese government argued that only those
including Viet Cong, was six months. See generally DALE ANDRADÉ, ASHES TO ASHES: THE
PHOENIX PROGRAM AND THE VIETNAM WAR (1990).
137 RAND REPORT, supra note 134, at 35–36.
138 See GEORGE S. PRUGH, LAW AT WAR: VIETNAM 1964–1973, at 63 (1975), available at
http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/Law-War/law-04.htm (noting that the United States
maintained that “the hostilities constituted an armed international conflict, that North Vietnam
was a belligerent, that the Viet Cong were agents of the government of North Vietnam,” and that,
therefore, the Geneva Conventions were fully applicable); see also Geneva Convention (III)
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 12, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3406, T.I.A.S.
No. 3364 (stating that “Detaining Power” is responsible for the treatment of POWs even if it
transfers those prisoners to another power).
139 DOYLE, supra note 133, at 191–92.
140 See id. at 311; SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 180; see also RAND REPORT, supra note 134, at
35.
141 RAND REPORT, supra note 134, at 39.
142 The South Vietnamese proposed returning sixty-two sick and wounded prisoners of war to
North Vietnam at the Paris Peace Talks of November 13, 1969, but the offer never received a
response. A January 1971 offer to repatriate all sick and wounded prisoners to North Vietnam,
and an April 1971 request to North Vietnam to conclude a bilateral agreement for the repatriation
or internment in a neutral country of those prisoners of war who had been held captive for a long
period of time, were both ignored. In May 1971, North Vietnam finally agreed to accept 570 sick
and wounded prisoners. The ICRC ultimately interviewed 660 sick and wounded prisoners, only
thirteen of whom wished to be repatriated. Before they could be released, North Vietnam
canceled the agreement, and they were returned to Da Nang. PRUGH, supra note 138, at 71.
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prisoners who renounced their allegiance to North Vietnam or the Viet
Cong should be eligible for release before war’s end; the Communists
refused even to furnish a list of the prisoners they held, and the Viet
Cong had no committee authorized to conduct negotiations over
prisoner exchanges. 143 Yet even in the face of these hurdles, some
prisoners were repatriated for medical reasons during the conflict.144
Indeed, at times U.S. commanders unilaterally released enemy prisoners
in the hope the North would reciprocate, a result achieved on rare
occasion. 145 Not that such exchanges remotely kept pace with the
volume of prisoners overall. By the end of 1971, South Vietnam held
35,665 prisoners, one-third of whom had been captured by U.S.
forces. 146
While Congress was relatively silent on prisoner issues in the early
years of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, it did become more
actively engaged as the conflict lengthened. 147 On several occasions,
Congress legislated out of concern for the mistreatment of U.S.
prisoners held by the North—in order to ensure American prisoners’
families had sufficient benefits 148—to express concern for the treatment
of American POWs, and to condemn enemy violations of the Geneva
Conventions. 149 Indeed, between 1969 and 1971, the House Foreign
SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 181.
See DOYLE, supra note 133, at 309–10. For instance, in April 1967, a screening program was
started to identify POWs who, because of illness, were qualified for release under Articles 109 and
110 of the Geneva Conventions. The screening team included two Swiss physicians under
contract to the ICRC. Of the 286 prisoners screened, 135 qualified medically for repatriation. Of
those qualified for repatriation, only thirty-nine wished to return to North Vietnam. To this
group was added a female prisoner of war who had given birth in a South Vietnamese hospital.
The forty prisoners and the infant were repatriated to North Vietnam through the demilitarized
zone on June 12, 1967; on the same day, four Viet Cong-United States prisoners were released in
South Vietnam. During 1967, a total of 139 POWs were released in South Vietnam or repatriated
to North Vietnam. PRUGH, supra note 138, at 71.
145 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 188. For example, in February 1967, twenty-eight North
Vietnamese prisoners of war were released to return to North Vietnam through the demilitarized
zone. The following month, two Viet Cong prisoners of war captured by U.S. forces were released
in response to the release of two U.S. POWs. A few months later, three more Viet Cong captured
by U.S. forces were released in exchange for the release of two U.S. prisoners and one Filipino
captured by the Viet Cong. DOYLE, supra note 133, at 309.
146 PRUGH, supra note 138, at 67.
147 Search: all statutes at large [1959–1976] for reference to Vietnam and prisoner or P.O.W.,
and Congressional Record for mentions of Vietnam and prisoner or POW. Searched ProQuest
Congressional for mentions of “Vietnam” and “prisoner or POW” returned thousands of results.
Limited search to “repatriat!” within that search, and turned up little, and nothing of huge import.
148 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-256, 88 Stat. 52 (expanding the period during
which Social Security Act benefits may be paid); Funeral Transportation and Living Expense
Benefits Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-257, 88 Stat. 53 (providing benefits to families of U.S. POWs who
died in prison); Act of June 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-289, 84 Stat. 323 (amending War Claims Act
of 1948 to include prisoners of war captured during the Vietnam conflict).
149 Act of Oct. 31, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-607, 86 Stat. 1948 (making supplemental
appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973); Proclamation No. 4115, 86 Stat. 1613
143
144
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Affairs Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific
Developments alone held at least sixteen days of hearings on multiple
bills and resolutions relating to American POWs in Southeast Asia. 150 In
1970, Congress passed two concurrent resolutions, which dealt with
American prisoners in Indochina, and again protested the treatment of
American prisoners by the North and called for justice on their behalf;
Congress also endorsed efforts to obtain better treatment and release of
U.S. prisoners. 151 Later, the legislature passed “sense of Congress” and
other hortatory legislation urging the full withdrawal of American
troops from Vietnam as soon as U.S. prisoners could be recovered. 152
Near the end of U.S. combat presence in Vietnam, Congress passed a
rider on an appropriations bill prohibiting the use of funds after August
1973 “to support directly or indirectly combat activities” in Vietnam
and surrounding countries. 153
(Mar. 10, 1972) (highlighting enemy’s Geneva violations and refusal to exchange or repatriate
prisoners).
150 See NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., REFERENCE INFORMATION PAPER NO. 90: A
FINDING AID TO RECORDS RELATING TO AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION
FROM THE VIETNAM WAR ERA, 1960–1994 app. O, available at http://www.archives.gov/
publications/ref-info-papers/90/appendix-o.html; see also CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY
ALMANAC, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 436–37 (1970).
151 See H.R. Con. Res. 582, 92d Cong. (1970) (enacted) (designating May 1, 1970, as a day for
an appeal for international justice for Americans held prisoner or missing in action in Southeast
Asia); H.R. Con. Res. 454, 91st Cong. (1970) (enacted) (protesting the treatment given prisoners
by North Vietnam and the Viet Cong and endorsed efforts to obtain better treatment and release).
152 In 1971, Congress passed two amendments related to United States withdrawal from
Vietnam—“sense of Congress” and “policy of the United States”—in order to withdraw U.S.
forces from Vietnam by a date subject to the release of American prisoners. When signing one of
them (Military Procurement Authorization, Pub L. No. 92-156, 85 Stat. 423 (1971)), President
Nixon issued a statement emphasizing that he was not bound by the policy language in the
amendment. COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 92d Cong., U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970’S: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT’S 1972 FOREIGN POLICY REPORT TO CONGRESS 51–52
(Comm. Print 1972). The Senate later tried and failed to pass the Mansfield Amendment, binding
legislation that would require the withdrawal of U.S. forces conditional on release of U.S.
prisoners of war. For an overview of legislative activity surrounding U.S. foreign policy of the
area, see COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 92d Cong., U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970’S: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT’S 1973 FOREIGN POLICY REPORT TO CONGRESS 51–52
(Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter 1973 FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS REPORT].
153 An Act Making Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1973, and
for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 93-50, 87 Stat. 99 (1973) (prohibiting the use of funds after
August 1973 “to support directly or indirectly combat activities” in or around Vietnam); see also
1973 FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS REPORT, supra note 152. Notably, a
contemporary report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office rejected the Defense
Department’s recent argument that this Vietnam-era statutory restriction on “combat activities”
meant to include prisoner operations as well. SUSAN A. POLING, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY NOTIFICATION
REQUIREMENT, NO. B-326013 (2014), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665390.pdf
(concluding that the Defense Department violated “section 8111 of the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2014 when it transferred five individuals detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
to the nation of Qatar” in exchange for Bowe Bergdahl without providing at least thirty days’
notice to relevant congressional committees).
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But in none of this legislative activity is there evidence of Congress
acting to restrict what authority or influence the President or the U.S.
military had over the release or exchange of Communist prisoners held
by the South Vietnamese (whether to accelerate or slow repatriation
efforts). On the contrary, in 1970, three years before the last American
combat troops left Vietnam, President Nixon called for the immediate
and unconditional release of all prisoners by both sides; the reaction to
the proposal on Capitol Hill was “heavily favorable.” 154
Ultimately, as in previous conflicts, the disposition of the vast
majority of prisoners of both sides captured during the conflict was
addressed through executive negotiation and conclusion of agreements
with the enemy. The Paris Peace Accords, negotiated and signed by the
United States as an executive agreement, entered into force on January
17, 1973, and were only subsequently submitted to Congress. 155 The
Accords provided for a cessation of all hostilities and required the
parties to exchange complete lists of all captured military personnel and
foreign civilians on the date of its entry into force. 156 Prisoner
repatriation would be carried out “simultaneously with and completed
not later than the same day as” the withdrawal of American troops from
South Vietnam. 157 Remaining prisoner issues, including the return of
North Vietnamese civilians still held by South Vietnam, were to be
resolved by a separate agreement between the Vietnamese parties in the
months following the adoption of the Accords. 158
For the Americans, the Paris Peace Accords were indeed effective
in securing the return of then-known U.S. POWs; repatriation of 588
154 See Robert B. Semple, Jr., Nixon Urges Supervised Truce in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos
and a Wider Peace Conference, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1970, at 1 (describing congressional reaction to
speech that evening from both sides of the aisle as “heavily favorable”); see also President Richard
Nixon, Address to the Nation About a New Initiative for Peace in Southeast Asia (Oct. 7, 1970),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2708.
155 WILLIAM GIBBONS & ALLAN FARLOW, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESS AND THE
TERMINATION OF THE VIETNAM WAR 9–10 (1973).
156 Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam art. 5, U.S.-Viet., Jan. 27,
1973, 24 U.S.T. 1 (“Within sixty days of the signing of this Agreement, there will be a total
withdrawal from South Viet-Nam of troops, military advisers, and military personnel . . . .”).
157 Id. art. 8(a) (“The return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties
shall be carried out simultaneously with and completed not later than the same day as the troop
withdrawal mentioned in Article 5. The parties shall exchange complete lists of the abovementioned captured military personnel and foreign civilians on the day of the signing of this
Agreement.”).
158 Id. art. 8(c) (“The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and
detained in South Viet-Nam will be resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties on the basis of
the principles of Article 21 (b) of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam of
July 20, 1954. The two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit of national reconciliation
and concord, with a view to ending hatred and enmity, in order to ease suffering and to reunite
families. The two South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to resolve this question within
ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect.” (footnote omitted)).
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American prisoners (including twenty-four civilians) was speedily and
successfully carried out between February and April 1973. 159 For the
Communist prisoners held by the South, success was less uniform.
According to the records kept by U.S. Forces, the South Vietnamese
held approximately 37,000 POWs at the end of American involvement
in the war, including about 10,000 North Vietnamese Army (NVA)
troops; the remainder were thought to be primarily Viet Cong. 160 While
the NVA troops were repatriated in the months following the Paris
Accords, thousands of the remaining detainees (exact numbers are
substantially disputed), many of whom were South Vietnamese
nationals sympathetic to the insurgency, remained in southern custody
of one form or another. 161 When NVA troops later succeeded in
capturing Saigon in 1975 and established a unified communist
government in Vietnam, the remaining detainees were freed. 162 Without
American protection, however, many of those thought to have resisted
repatriation or collaborated with the enemy were subsequently
executed. 163
V. 1991 GULF WAR
The brief duration of the first Gulf War might create the
misimpression that detention operations in that conflict were relatively
inconsequential. On the contrary, the U.S. military described the 1991
conflict as the United States’ largest war prisoner operation since World
War II. 164 Between January 22, 1991, when the first prisoner was
captured, and May 2, 1991, when the United States transferred the final
prisoner from its custody, U.S. detention facilities processed nearly

159 FLOYD S. PARLIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE RETURN OF AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR
FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA (1975).
160 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 189 (citing REPATRIATION OF ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, Box
18, Entry PMG POWD, RG 472, RECORDS OF THE UNITED STATES FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA,

1950–1975 (1973)).
161 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 189; see also DOYLE, supra note 133, at 289; STAFF OF HOUSE
COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 93d Cong., VIETNAM—A CHANGING CRUCIBLE: REPORT OF A
STUDY MISSION TO SOUTH VIETNAM 40 (Comm. Print 1974) (reporting on a mission conducted
by Rep. Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen (R-NJ), Feb. 25–28, 1974, to South Vietnam evaluating fate of
remaining Communist “political prisoners” held by South); id. at 36 app. 5 (reprinting of
Airgram-296, Dec. 26, 1973 from American Embassy Saigon to U.S. Department of State assessing
number of remaining prisoners).
162 DOYLE, supra note 133, at 289.
163 Id.
164 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT: AN INTERIM REPORT TO
CONGRESS (1991) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. INTERIM REPORT], available at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/PersianGulfWar/305.pdf.
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70,000 detainees, 165 including through the use of battlefield hearings on
prisoner status pursuant to Article 5 of the Geneva Convention (III)
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. 166 At the outset of
hostilities, the United States quickly secured military-to-military
agreements with allies France and the United Kingdom, setting forth the
procedure to be followed by any capturing forces in processing POWs
or other detainees, initially through U.S. detention or medical facilities
in theater. 167 Although American military police and combat engineers
raced to build prison facilities in theater from scratch, 168 the United
States also undertook a separate agreement with Saudi Arabia that
authorized the subsequent transfer of many of these prisoners to
existing Saudi facilities. 169 By the end of the conflict, more than 35,000
prisoners were held in U.S. facilities, with 63,000 more held in Saudi
Arabia. 170
Almost immediately after U.S. and coalition forces ceased offensive
operations on February 28, the Iraqis agreed to attend military-tomilitary talks to discuss terms for the cessation of hostilities and the
return of captured prisoners. 171 While the Iraqis were prepared
promptly to return coalition prisoners, they were unprepared to manage
the influx of the much greater number of Iraqi prisoners held by the
coalition. 172 Furthermore, as quickly became evident to U.S. and
coalition forces, thousands of Iraqis did not wish to be repatriated, with
many Iraqi soldiers reportedly saying that they had been conscripted
into the Iraqi military during visits to Iraq. 173 The phenomenon was
now familiar in U.S. conflicts of the twentieth century.
Yet despite such potentially complicating circumstances, the
repatriation or transfer of prisoners following the conflict proceeded
165 Id. at 12-4. U.S. forces captured more than 60,000 of these; the remainder were seized by
French and British allies and then transferred to U.S. control.
166 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT: FINAL REPORT TO CONG,
102ND CONG., L-3 (1992) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. FINAL REPORT], available at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/PersianGulfWar/404.pdf.
167 Id.
168 Michael R. Gordon, Iraqi War Prisoners Now Find Themselves Men Without a Country,
N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/05/world/after-the-war-iraqi-warprisoners-now-find-themselves-men-without-a-country.html (ultimately housing 15,241
prisoners, guarded by 1550 Americans).
169 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. FINAL REPORT, supra note 166, at L-3.
170 War
Chronology: March 1991, NAVAL HISTORY & HERITAGE COMMAND,
http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/dstorm/dsmar.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2014) (reporting that
an additional 3000 or more prisoners were held in Turkey).
171 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. FINAL REPORT, supra note 166, at L-3.
172 See id. at L-16.
173 KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 93-893 F, IRAQ: ADMISSION OF REFUGEES
INTO THE UNITED STATES (1993); Gordon, supra note 168 (reporting that others asked the
Americans to take them into custody because they thought it would be the best way of escaping
from Iraq).
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with remarkable speed. Iraq and coalition forces reached a
memorandum of understanding by early March detailing administrative
procedures for prisoner repatriation to be carried out under the auspices
of the ICRC. On March 4, Iraq released the first group of coalition
prisoners, including six Americans. Two days later, the United States
responded by releasing 294 prisoners to the ICRC for repatriation to
Iraq. 174 Follow-on procedures provided for repatriation of detainees to
Iraq at a planned rate of approximately 5000 a day. 175 Of the
approximately 14,000 prisoners who did not want to return to Iraq, the
United States initially embraced only two: one who had dual Iraqi and
American citizenship and another who had previously resided in the
United States. 176 The remaining prisoners were returned to Saudi
Arabia, 177 with coalition governments taking the position that the nonrepatriating Iraqis should be reclassified as refugees. 178 Ultimately, the
vast majority of prisoners in Saudi Arabia were repatriated to Iraq under
ICRC auspices after Saddam Hussein issued a general amnesty. 179 In all
events, all prisoners had been transferred from U.S. custody by May 2,
1991. 180 On August 23, the ICRC announced that the repatriation of
Iraqi prisoners was complete. 181 And the ICRC concluded that the
“treatment of Iraqi prisoners of war by U.S. forces was the best
compliance with the Geneva Convention by any nation in any conflict
in history.” 182
Despite the relative speed with which the United States and its
allies carried out both the build up to war and its denouement,
congressional engagement was hardly impossible. On the contrary, in
the few months leading up to war, Congress managed to enact multiple
pieces of legislation variously supporting economic sanctions after Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait, authorizing the deployment of forces to defend
Saudi Arabia, authorizing the use of force in Iraq, authorizing arms sales
to the Saudis, and appropriating funds to support all of these

174 War
Chronology:
January
1991,
NAVAL
HISTORY
&
HERITAGE,
http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/dstorm/dsjan2.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2014).
175 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. FINAL REPORT, supra note 166, at L-17.
176 See id. at app. O-20; Gordon, supra note 168.
177 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 164, at 12-5; see also DOYLE, supra note
133, at 297.
178 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. FINAL REPORT, supra note 166, at L-17. The ICRC urged that the
non-repatriating Iraqis be treated as civilians protected under the Fourth Geneva Convention. See
SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 180.
179 Richard Serrano, Iraq POWs Paid to Resettle in U.S.; Lawmakers Protest, L.A. TIMES (Aug.
24, 1993), http://articles.latimes.com/1993-08-24/news/mn-27486_1_united-states.
180 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. FINAL REPORT, supra note 166, at L-17.
181 See id. at L-17.
182 See id. at L-1.
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activities. 183 Congress was likewise far from blind to the issue of wartime
detention; just two days after the first capture of Iraqi troops by
coalition forces, the Senate agreed to a resolution condemning Iraqi
treatment of its POWs. 184 Yet once again, even as the military and
executive branch negotiated the series of international agreements with
U.S. allies and eventually the Iraqis themselves for the handling and
prompt repatriation of Iraqi prisoners, Congress took no steps to
regulate the executive’s handling of prisoners in our custody. 185
It was only well after the United States had handed its detainees
over to other international authorities that Congress reawakened to the
question of our former prisoners. In 1992, the United Nations High
Commissioner on Refugees expressed concern that some of the ex-Iraqi
soldiers (about 4000 had remained in refugee status in Saudi Arabia)
could not be safely returned to Iraq in light of a well-grounded fear of
persecution. 186 In response, the George H. W. Bush Administration
joined a multinational resettlement effort and decided to admit a
number of Iraqi refugees into the United States pursuant to existing U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Act authorities. 187 Recalling that many
Iraqi soldiers had surrendered to U.S. forces during the conflict, that
some had even provided valuable services to U.S. forces in the aftermath
of the war, and maintaining that all such admissions were within the
existing United States ceiling for refugees from Near East and South
Asia, the Bush and then Clinton Administrations admitted close to
10,000 Iraqi refugees into the United States between 1992 and 1994,
many of them former war prisoners of the United States. 188
Members of Congress soon raised a variety of concerns: that the
former detainees were being resettled in cities across the United States at
183 See CLYDE R. MARK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 91-156 F, IRAQ/KUWAIT CRISIS:
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION THROUGH JANUARY 1991, at 1–2 (1991) (summarizing congressional
action on the Persian Gulf crisis through January 1991, including sanctions against Iraq,
authorization of force, military funding and aid, and arms transfers).
184 S. Con. Res. 5, 102d Cong. (1991).
185 This conclusion is based on a search of U.S. Statutes at Large (from 1991–1992) for any text
containing “prisoner and Iraq or Gulf,” as well as a search of ProQuest Congressional
Publications between Jan. 1, 1990 and Jan. 1, 1992 for any text containing “prisoner and Iraq.”
186 REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, NO. A/47/12
(1992), available at http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68c860.html.
187 See KATZMAN, supra note 173, at 2 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1107 (2012)); see also Serrano,
supra note 179.
188 See KATZMAN, supra note 173, at 2; see also William Claiborne, Resettling Iraqi POWs in
U.S. Criticized; Lawmakers Urge Clinton to End ‘Potentially Dangerous,’ WASH. POST, Aug. 25,
1993. In 1992, the United States admitted 3442 Iraqis—956 from Saudi camps, about 300 of
whom were former soldiers and their families. KATZMAN, supra note 173, at 3. In 1993, the
United States admitted 4600 Iraqis, including 533 former soldiers and their families. Id. In 1994,
the United States admitted approximately 3000 Iraqis, including about 1000 former soldiers and
their families. Id.
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public expense (including in California, Florida, Texas, Michigan, and
Illinois); that the U.S. government was thus placing the interests of these
former Iraqi soldiers ahead of those of U.S. veterans; and that the Iraqis
were a potential terrorist threat. 189 Ultimately more than eighty
legislators called on President Clinton to end the “potentially dangerous
and unfair policy of resettling captured Iraqi soldiers in the United
States along with deserving civilian Iraqi refugees.” 190 Administration
officials tried to allay these concerns, pointing out that before entering
the United States, the Iraqis had to be cleared by the FBI and sign a
promissory note to reimburse the U.S. government for their
transportation costs after they became self-sufficient. 191 Yet even under
these circumstances, Congress took only the most limited action—a
non-binding Sense of the Senate resolution expressing the Senate’s view
that no Iraqi ex-soldier be resettled in the United States unless the
President certified to Congress that the individual had assisted the
coalition after capture and had not committed war crimes. 192 While the
Clinton Administration continued working to reassure Congress of the
program’s adequate checks, resettlement efforts pressed ahead. In 1994
alone, close to 5000 Iraqi refugees were resettled in the United States. 193
VI. 2003 IRAQ WAR
Although the United States no longer holds any detainees in its
custody in Iraq, the history of U.S. detention operations following the
2003 invasion there is still very much being written. Despite the
extraordinary public attention focused on detention operations
following the public revelations of the torture of U.S.-held prisoners
See KATZMAN, supra note 173, at 4; see also Claiborne, supra note 188.
See Claiborne, supra note 188 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. (“According
to a State Department memorandum sent to congressional offices skeptical of the resettlement
program, ‘many of those persons had provided valuable services to U.S. forces in the aftermath of
the war.’”).
191 Serrano, supra note 179 (“They eventually were repatriated to Iraq under the auspices of
the International Red Cross after Saddam Hussein issued a general amnesty. But 4,000 remained
in the camps. Most apparently had surrendered after reading leaflets dropped by U.S. planes that
guaranteed their safety.”).
192 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, H.R. 2401, 103d Cong. § 1164
(1993) (“It is the sense of the Senate that no person who was a member of the armed forces of Iraq
during the period from August 2, 1990 through February 28, 1991, and who is in a refugee camp
in Saudi Arabia as of the date of enactment of this Act should be granted entry into the United
States under the Immigration and Nationality Act unless the President certifies to Congress
before such entry that such person—(1) assisted the United States or coalition armed forces after
defection from the armed forces of Iraq or after capture by the United States or coalition armed
forces; and (2) did not commit or assist in the commission of war crimes.”).
193 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’N FOR REFUGEES, IRAQI REFUGEE AND ASYLUM-SEEKER
STATISTICS (2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/3e79b00b9.pdf.
189
190
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there—or perhaps because of these and other extraordinary features of
U.S. operations 194—there is as yet no final, official public report
documenting the number and status of detainees held in U.S. custody in
Iraq from 2003 to 2011, when the final U.S.-held prisoners were
transferred or released. 195 There are, however, multiple official interim
reports on various topics, as well as press reports based on periodic
official statements, which make it possible to draw at least a rough
sketch of the overall picture of U.S. prisoner operations in Iraq.
According to a Brookings Institute study of press reports, the
United States held on the order of 90,000 detainees in Iraq between 2003
and 2010. 196 The numbers fluctuated substantially over the course of the
conflict. In October 2003, for example, Defense Department
investigations show that the United States held about 7000 prisoners at
one of its main in-theater detention facilities at Abu Ghraib. 197 The
number of U.S.-held detainees hit an apex in late 2007, with
approximately 26,000 detainees (and another approximately 24,000
individuals in Iraqi government custody). 198 By May 2010, according to
the U.S. Defense Department, the number was down to under 3000. 199
While it is thus apparent that the United States was both capturing
and releasing detainees throughout the period, to understand why it
remains less than clear exactly how those decisions were made requires
some brief background. As post-Abu Ghraib Pentagon investigations
uniformly concluded, “pre-war planning [for Iraq did] not include[]
planning for detainee operations.” 200 While the Administration stated
194 For an account of the early legal and policy decision-making that shaped U.S. detention
operations in Iraq, and set the conditions for the widespread abuses there, see Deborah N.
Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power: Interrogation, Detention, and
Torture, 81 IND. L. J. 1255 (2006).
195 Charlie Savage, U.S. Transfers Its Last Prisoner in Iraq to Iraqi Custody, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
17, 2011, at A11 [hereinafter Savage, Iraqi Custody]; see also Qassim Abdul-Zahra & Rebecca
Santana, Iraq: US Hands Over Detainees Save Hezbollah Agent, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 22, 2011),
http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2011/11/22/iraq_us_hands_over_
detainees_save_hezbollah_agent (“The U.S. handed over all of the remaining detainees in U.S.
custody in Iraq Tuesday, except for a Lebanese Hezbollah commander linked to the death of four
American troops, Iraqi and American officials said.”).
196 MICHAEL E. O’HANLON & IAN LIVINGSTON, IRAQ INDEX: TRACKING VARIABLES OF
RECONSTRUCTION & SECURITY IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ 12 (Brookings Inst. ed. 2011).
197 JAMES R. SCHLESINGER ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW
DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS 11, 59–60 (2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/aug
2004/d20040824finalreport.pdf.
198 O’HANLON & LIVINGSTON, supra note 196, at 12; accord RAND REPORT, supra note 134, at
67, fig. 5.4.
199 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., MEASURING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN IRAQ 46 (2010) [hereinafter
DOD 2010 IRAQ REPORT], available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/June_9204_Sec_Def_
signed_20_Aug_2010.pdf.
200 ANTHONY R. JONES, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON AND THE
205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 24 (2004), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/
docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf (marked “Unclassified”).
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publicly that it would only hold detainees under the protection of the
Geneva Conventions, 201 the United States early in the conflict began
housing thousands of detainees in Iraq it classified with a shifting range
of terms unfamiliar in Geneva-based Army doctrine at the time: enemy
combatants, unprivileged enemy combatants, security internees,
criminal detainees, military intelligence holds, persons under U.S. forces
control, and low-level enemy combatants. 202 Traditional categories such
as prisoner of war were used for only a handful of the thousands of
prisoners the United States held in its custody. 203 At the same time,
Administration lawyers pursued novel interpretations of various Geneva
provisions. For instance, Article 49 of Geneva IV broadly prohibits the
removal of “protected persons from occupied territory.” 204 Yet in the
investigations following Abu Ghraib, it became clear that some
prisoners had been removed from U.S.-occupied Iraq. 205 It also
eventually became clear that U.S. forces in Iraq were holding prisoners
without recording their identity or existence on official Army records,
again a violation of Geneva treaty rules and U.S. implementing
regulations. 206
201 Briefing on Geneva Convention, EPW’s and War Crimes, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (April 7, 2003),
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2281.
202 GEORGE R. FAY, AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU GHRAIB DETENTION FACILITY AND
205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 11–12 (2004), available at http://news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf (marked “Unclassified,” with sections redacted) [hereinafter FAY
REPORT]; DEP’T OF THE ARMY INSPECTOR GEN., DETAINEE OPERATIONS INSPECTION 44–47
(2004) [hereinafter DAIG REPORT] (unmarked, unclassified). Established military doctrine
implementing the Geneva regime had recognized four categories of detainees: enemy POWs,
retained personnel, civilian internees, and a catch-all “other detainee” category. See DAIG
REPORT, supra, at 44–47; FAY REPORT, supra, at 11–12.
203 DEBORAH PEARLSTEIN, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ENDING SECRET DETENTIONS 9–17 (Michael
Posner
ed.,
2004)
[hereinafter
SECRET
DETENTIONS],
available
at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/EndingSecretDetentions_web.pdf;
Enemy Prisoner of War Briefing from Kuwait City, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (May 8, 2003),
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2588.
204 Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention categorically prohibits the forcible transfer or
deportation of “protected persons” outside occupied territory. Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.
287 (entered into force with respect to the United States Feb. 2, 1956) (“Individual or mass
forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the
territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited,
regardless of their motive.”); see also Dana Priest, Memo Lets CIA Take Detainees Out of Iraq,
WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2004, at A1; Memorandum from Jack L. Goldsmith, Assistant Attorney
Gen., on the Permissibility on Relocating Certain “Protected Persons” from Occupied Iraq to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Mar. 19, 2004) [Goldsmith Memorandum],
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/doj_memo031904.pdf.
205 In March 2004, Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith wrote a confidential memo to
Alberto Gonzales, arguing that the CIA could secretly transfer prisoners out of Iraq, despite
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. See Dana, supra note 204; Goldsmith Memorandum,
supra note 204.
206 SECRET DETENTIONS, supra note 203, at 7.
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Despite the resulting gaps in public knowledge of some details, the
significant fluctuation in the number of prisoners held make it clear that
the United States was engaged in Iraq, as it had been in every previous
conflict, in prisoner release, transfer, and repatriation efforts throughout
the conflict. More, these arrangements proceeded under terms set
almost entirely by the executive branch and America’s international
partners. For prisoners held in-country immediately following the
collapse of the Baghdad regime in 2003, detainee policy was set in
substantial part by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA),
established in Iraq about one month after U.S. and allied forces took
control of Baghdad on April 9, 2003. 207 While the CPA’s actual
institutional status remains uncertain—Congress understood it as a U.S.
federal agency while the Army described it as an international
organization run by a multinational coalition—the CPA was headed by
a U.S. presidentially appointed civilian administrator and staffed by a
mix of U.S. and allied military and civilian personnel. 208
Beginning in 2004, when the Iraqi government re-established
sovereign control, and continuing until 2008, detention operations were
governed by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
1546, adopted pursuant to the Council’s authority under Chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter. UNSCR 1546 established the authority of a
coalition of multinational forces to support the Iraqi government
(MNF-I). 209 Under this authorization, U.S. military-led Task Force 134
(TF-134) had responsibility for U.S. detention operations in Iraq. 210
While the description of who could be detained—and subject to
what set of procedural protections—pursuant to these shifting
authorities varied over time, 211 both CPA rules and Defense Department
207 L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32370, THE COALITION PROVISIONAL
AUTHORITY (CPA): ORIGIN, CHARACTERISTICS, AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES (2005)
[hereinafter HALCHIN CRS REPORT], available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32370.pdf. The
CPA was charged with a broad mission: “to restore conditions of security and stability, to create
conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future (including by
advancing efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative
governance) and facilitating economic recovery, sustainable reconstruction and development.” Id.
at 1 (quoting U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION
1506 OF THE EMERGENCY WARTIME SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2003 (PUBLIC LAW
108-11), at 2 (2003)).
208 Id. at 5 (noting that it was unclear whether the CPA was established under the President’s
authority, the U.S. military’s authority, or pursuant to UN Security Council authorization).
209 S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004); see also Brian J. Bill, Detention
Operations in Iraq: A View from the Ground, 86 INT’L L. STUD. 411, 416 (2010). This initial
resolution was set to expire in 2005; subsequent resolutions extended its authority until the end of
2008. See S.C. Res. 1790, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1790 (Dec. 18, 2007); S.C. Res. 1723, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1723 (Nov. 28, 2006); S.C. Res. 1637, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1637 (Nov. 8, 2005).
210 Bill, supra note 209, at 417–18.
211 In its initial detention policy memorandum, issued in June 2003, the CPA identified two
categories of detainees: (1) security detainees, who were to be provided periodic administrative
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implementing directives provided for some form of periodic review of
the continued need for detention. 212 Release decisions could be made at
multiple levels of review, with final release recommendations made—if
not earlier—by a joint U.S.-Iraqi committee, and releases carried out
subject to the approval of the U.S. Deputy Commanding General for
Detention Operations. 213
Throughout the U.N. mandate period, both detention and release
of prisoners were commonplace. At times, releases were pursued for
relatively isolated reasons. The Iraqi government, for example,
announced that it intended to release some 2000 prisoners in time for
the Eid holiday in 2006 as a goodwill gesture, and U.S. commanders felt
little choice but to help comply. 214 More common were regular
recommendations for and approvals of release, a rate that varied during
the period (depending on the applicable review systems, the strategic
environment, and so forth) from 12–15% of detentions reviewed early
in the period, to 25–40% of detentions reviewed toward the end of the
United Nations-authorized detention operations. 215 Beyond this, some
detainees suspected of criminal activity were transferred to the Iraqi
criminal justice system for prosecution. 216 Further, as U.S.
counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq evolved through 2007, U.S.
commanders pursued the creation of local “reconciliation” centers,
where recently released detainees would be provided civic and
vocational training. Both these post-detention support opportunities

hearings, including by a joint Iraqi-U.S. Combined Review Board, based on Geneva Convention
provisions regarding detention during occupation; and (2) criminal suspects, who were to be
transferred to Iraqi domestic authorities for prosecution. RAND REPORT, supra note 134, at 51–
52. From 2004 to 2008, under the UNSCR 1546 scheme, coalition forces were permitted to pursue
“internment where this is necessary for imperative reasons of security,” again modeled after
Geneva rules for circumstances of occupation. S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 209, at 11. TF-134’s
detention operations soon expanded to include not only the categories of detainees recognized by
the CPA, but also individuals who were wanted for questioning more broadly, or who were
perceived as obstructing military operations. RAND REPORT, supra note 134, at 58.
212 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 2310.01E: THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DETAINEE
PROGRAM ¶ 4.8 (2006) [hereinafter DoDD 2310.01E], available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/
pdfs/Detainee_Prgm_Dir_2310_9-5-06.pdf; L. PAUL BREMER, COAL. PROVISIONAL AUTH.,
MEMORANDUM NO. 3 (REVISED): CRIMINAL PROCEDURES, CPA/MEM/27 (2004) [hereinafter
CPA MEMO 3], available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040627_CPAMEMO_3_
Criminal_Procedures__Rev_.pdf. For a description of the procedures followed in practice, see
Bill, supra note 209.
213 Bill, supra note 209, at 427–28, 431.
214 RAND REPORT, supra note 134, at 59 (reporting these releases took place even as TF-134
struggled, sometimes unsuccessfully, to keep track of its remaining prisoners).
215 Bill, supra note 209, at 432.
216 RAND REPORT, supra note 134, at 60 (noting that the Iraqi criminal justice system suffered
a variety of problems and did not always succeed in prosecution justifying continued custody).
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and prisoner release ceremonies in particular became important tools of
counterinsurgency strategy touted by U.S. officials to the Iraqi press. 217
After 2004, it can hardly be doubted that Congress was acutely
aware of U.S. detention operations in Iraq. The revelations of torture at
Abu Ghraib had been followed by an intense flurry of legislative activity,
hearings and legislation, geared toward addressing issues of prisoner
treatment. 218 Congress also engaged vigorously over what was to be
done about an insurgency that appeared to be gaining strength. Yet on
the question of who could be transferred or released from U.S. custody
in Iraq under the baseline processes in effect from 2003 to 2008,
Congress was, characteristically, silent. Perhaps even more remarkably,
Congress’ relative non-involvement on detention issues held even as the
United States undertook negotiations beginning in 2008 over the
framework agreement for continued U.S. presence in—and eventual
withdrawal from—Iraq. With the question of what to do with the
remaining detainees regularly on the front page of the New York
Times, 219 and the operative U.N. mandate for U.S. forces in Iraq set to
expire at the end of that year, 220 Congress did not hesitate to take on a
range of issues regarding the terms of any agreement with the still fragile
Iraqi government for continued U.S. participation. 221 Members of
Congress proposed a series of measures demanding that the President
get congressional authorization for any agreement he might reach.222
Indeed, Congress succeeded in enacting several conditions on the
expenditure of defense funds in 2007 and 2008 bearing directly on the
agreement—conditions prohibiting the use of any funds to enter into a

Id. at 72–74.
See, e.g., Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, H.R. 2863, 109th Cong. § 1003(a) (2005) (“No
individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States Government,
regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment.”); see also Harold Hongjuh Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in
Chief?, 81 IND. L.J. 1145 (2006) (describing activities surrounding passage of legislation).
219 See, e.g., Alissa J. Rubin, A Puzzle Over Prisoners as Iraqis Take Control, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
25, 2008, at A1.
220 S.C. Res. 1790, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1790 (Dec. 18, 2007); see also Press Release, The White
House, Fact Sheet: U.S.-Iraq Declaration of Principles for Friendship and Cooperation (Nov. 26,
2007), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/11/2007
1126-1.html.
221 See MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34568, U.S.-IRAQ AGREEMENTS:
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 7 (2009), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/125517.pdf (listing proposed and enacted
legislation).
222 As senators, both Vice President Biden and Secretary of State Clinton introduced
legislation to require consultation with, and approval from, Congress before the Agreements with
Iraq were finalized. Then-Senator Obama was a co-sponsor of then-Senator Clinton’s bill, S. 2426,
110th Cong. (2007).
217
218
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permanent basing rights agreement with Iraq; 223 prohibiting the use of
funds for any agreement that would subject members of the U.S. Armed
Forces to the jurisdiction of Iraq criminal courts or punishment under
Iraq law; 224 and requiring the post hoc reporting to Congress of any
agreement reached with Iraq bearing on those subjects, or on the rules
of engagement under which U.S. troops operate in Iraq, or on any
longer term security commitment with Iraq. 225 The post hoc reporting
provision even required “[a]n assessment of authorities under the
agreement” for U.S. and coalition troops “to apprehend, detain, and
interrogate prisoners and otherwise collect intelligence.” 226 Yet none of
these conditions in any way restricted the military’s authority to
continue its prisoner release and repatriation programs as it saw fit.
Ultimately, the United States negotiated two significant
instruments with Iraq as executive agreements on November 18, 2008:
the Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship
and Cooperation Between the United States of America and the
Republic of Iraq, 227 and an Agreement Between the United States of
America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States
Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities During Their
Temporary Presence in Iraq (the Security Agreement). 228 The impact of
these agreements on U.S. detention operations in Iraq would be
substantial. Pursuant to the Security Agreement, U.S. forces would no
longer be permitted to detain any person unless Iraqi officials requested
it, or the arrest was otherwise in accordance with Iraqi law. 229 Any
detainees picked up pursuant to these rules would have to be turned
over to the Iraqi authorities within twenty-four hours of their arrest. 230
Further, the United States committed to “release all the remaining
detainees in a safe and orderly manner unless otherwise requested by
[the Iraqi government].” 231 Pursuant to the terms of the Security
Agreement, the United States released or transferred more than 8000
223 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 680, 121 Stat. 1844, 2359
(2007.).
224 Id. § 612.
225 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110417, § 1212(a)(1), 122 Stat. 4356, 4627 (2008).
226 Id. § 1212(b)(4).
227 Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation Between
the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, Nov. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.usf-iraq.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/security-agreement-2.pdf.
228 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the
Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities During
Their Temporary Presence in Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, Nov. 17, 2008 [hereinafter Security Agreement],
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122074.pdf.
229 Id. art. 22 ¶ 1.
230 Id. art. 22 ¶ 2.
231 Id. art. 22 ¶ 4.
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prisoners between January 2009 (when the Security Agreement went
into effect) and June 2010. 232
It was only beginning in 2009, as U.S. operations in Iraq drew to a
close, that Congress began to focus more directly on prisoner transfer
and release operations. But in no case did Congress impose actual
restrictions on U.S. release and transfer efforts, which continued apace.
Most concrete among congressional activities during this period was to
impose additional post hoc reporting measures in 2009, including for
the first time requiring the Administration to keep it informed of how
many prisoners the United States transferred or released from its
custody in Iraq. 233 As the Administration worked through the final
prisoners in its custody in 2011, several members of Congress expressed
concern about the handling of a few discrete cases. 234 Some had argued
that certain U.S.-held prisoners in Iraq, suspected of criminal activity,
should be transferred to Guantanamo Bay and prosecuted in military
commissions, rather than left to the Iraqi authorities for prosecution,
even if it meant secreting the detainees out of the country against the
wishes of the new Iraqi Prime Minister. 235 Yet these expressions of
concern were ultimately unproductive; Congress took no particular
action on individual cases either. And by the end of December 2011, the
United States was out of the detention business in Iraq. 236
CONCLUSION
For the majorities of Congress who have voted repeatedly to
embrace stark restrictions on the President’s authority to transfer,
232 DOD 2010 IRAQ REPORT, supra note 199. DOD filed reports with Congress providing this
information in September and December 2009, and in March and July 2010, which are all
available online. See id. While press reports make clear that additional detainees were released
following July 2010, there is no similar record of subsequent reports to Congress.
233 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84,
§ 1227(b)(4), 123 Stat. 2190, 2526 (2009) (requiring assessment of, inter alia, total number of
detainees held by the United States in Iraq, number of detainees transferred to Iraqi authorities,
the number of detainees who were released from U.S. custody and the reasons for their release,
and “the number of detainees who having been released in the past were recaptured or had their
remains identified planning or after carrying out attacks on United States or Coalition forces”).
234 See, e.g., Liz Sly & Peter Finn, U.S. Hands over Hezbollah Prisoner to Iraq, WASH. POST
(Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-hands-overhezbollah-prisoner-to-iraq/2011/12/16/gIQABm2oyO_story.html (reporting several Members’
concern over the transfer to Iraqi criminal authorities of Ali Musa Daqduq, a senior member of
the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah movement, suspected of killings five U.S. soldiers in 2007).
235 See, e.g., id.
236 Savage, Iraqi Custody, supra note 195; see also Abdul-Zahra & Santana, supra note 195
(“The U.S. handed over all of the remaining detainees in U.S. custody in Iraq Tuesday, except for
a Lebanese Hezbollah commander linked to the death of four American troops, Iraqi and
American officials said.”).
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prosecute, or release prisoners at Guantanamo Bay in recent years, the
motives are undoubtedly varied. Some no doubt harbor sincere
concerns about the security impact of releasing certain individual
detainees, even to countries far removed from the United States—
particularly when those individuals have stated they remain committed
to doing America harm, and particularly when those individuals could
only be sent to countries still in sufficient turmoil to lack well
established security systems themselves. 237 Yet without discounting the
significance of such concerns, history demonstrates that it is precisely
such risks the United States has repeatedly embraced in order to reap
the greater benefit of bringing wars to an end.
For many, the response (post-September 11) to any argument from
historical example has been to insist on the uniqueness of current
circumstances. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates are a different kind of enemy;
the war we have been fighting since 2001 is a different kind of war. 238 In
one sense, this is, of course, true. 239 But in key respects, there are
important parallels. The notion of returning prisoners to a homeland of
violent political instability, for example, is not new. We returned
prisoners twice to post-war European nations whose economic,
political, and state security systems had been decimated by what were
then the most destructive wars history had ever known. Neither is it the
case that we would never release prisoners who still harbor violent
intentions toward the United States. In World War II, among the first
prisoners released were those Nazis whose enmity was “most hardened”
against us. Nor can it be contended that we would never release
prisoners as long as they have ideological brethren with whom they
might again affiliate in re-engaging the fight. We returned thousands of
237 See, e.g., Stacy Kaper, Obama, Congress Bring Guantanamo Bay Prison Closer to Closed,
NAT’L J. (Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.nationaljournal.com/defense/obama-congress-bringguantanamo-bay-prison-closer-to-closed-20131223 (“‘While calling for the closure of
Guantanamo Bay makes a great campaign talking point, doing so will undermine good
intelligence collection and increase the risk that the dangerous detainees who are held there will
be back on the streets plotting to kill Americans . . . .’” (quoting Senator Saxby Chambliss)).
Others may vote in favor of such restrictions out of a sense of the necessity of political
compromise; the restrictions have invariably been attached to mammoth defense spending bills,
essential to fund a vast array of U.S. defense and security operations of which Guantanamo is but
a small part. See Press Release, Statement by the President on H.R. 3304 (Dec. 26, 2013), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/26/statement-president-hr-3304.
238 See, e.g., Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to President
George W. Bush (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB
127/02.01.25.pdf.
239 Indeed, many have argued that outside Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States’ insistence
on treating its engagements with al-Qaeda and affiliates as a “war” at all is without justification in
any legal sense contemplated by the Geneva Convention regime; in combating terrorist
organizations, the argument goes, the criminal law, not the law of war, is the appropriate
framework. See, e.g., NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE
ACTORS 95–97 (2010).
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communist prisoners to communist nations—for a half-century our
most feared, most hated ideological opponents—at the height of a halfcentury long war that was “hot” (in Korea and Vietnam) almost as often
as it was cold, and that was defined by the standing deployment of U.S.
armed forces to countries all over the world. 240
Of equal relevance, we returned prisoners not only to state
enemies, but also to non-state enemies as well. 241 In Vietnam, we at
times unilaterally released Viet Cong prisoners, taking a calculated risk
that any short-term tactical burden we might bear was outweighed by
the long-term strategic benefit to the United States of acting, and being
seen to act, in a manner consistent with the law.
History need not be understood as constitutionally binding to offer
useful insights into contemporary problems. It may at the least offer
reassurance that the United States has long experience in bringing
wartime detention to an end.

240 See generally JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL
OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR (Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed.

2005).

241 Perhaps, a critic might respond, but the Viet Cong did not have access to nuclear or
biological weapons, or modern means of delivering them, as terrorist groups of today might. See,
e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF
TERRORISM 3–4, 13–14 (2006); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises
Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1026–27 (2003). Yet, national security scholars and
policymakers have been occupied with concerns that a non-state actor might acquire and deploy a
weapon of such destructive potential since the Vietnam era and before. See, e.g., U.S. OFFICE OF
TECH. ASSESSMENT, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS, at iii, 30 (1977), available at
https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk3/1977/7705/7705.PDF (concluding that “a clever and
competent [non-state] group could design and construct a device which would give a significant
nuclear yield”); see also JOHN MCPHEE, THE CURVE OF BINDING ENERGY: A JOURNEY INTO THE
AWESOME AND ALARMING WORLD OF THEODORE B. TAYLOR (1974) (detailing threat of nuclear
terrorism); Jeffrey T. Richelson, Defusing Nuclear Terror, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Mar./Apr.
2002, at 38, 39–43 (citing 1963 national intelligence estimate called The Clandestine Introduction
of Weapons of Mass Destruction into the U.S. and describing series of meetings in 1972 hosted by
then Chair of U.S. Atomic Energy Commission regarding prospect of terrorist attempts to steal
weapons-grade material to make bomb for use against United States).

